A country divided the impacts of fragmented communities on Iraq's government by Hubbard, Andrew P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2007-09
A country divided the impacts of fragmented
communities on Iraq's government
Hubbard, Andrew P.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
A COUNTRY DIVIDED: THE IMPACTS OF 









 Thesis Advisor:  Abbas Kadhim 
 Second Reader: Vali Nasr 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
 September 2007 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE    A Country Divided: The Impacts of Fragmented 
Communities on Iraq’s Government 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Andrew Hubbard 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis seeks to answer the question “What effect do Iraq’s fragmented communities have on the 
government’s ability to consolidate control in the country?”  To answer this question, this thesis examines three 
underlying factors, essentially on the three levels of analysis (individual, communal, and state): first, why Iraqis are 
more loyal to their communities than to the central government; second, how the political militias in Iraq affect the 
security situation in the country (both adversely and positively), and lastly examines how Iraqi politics impacts the 
government’s ability to consolidate control over the country.  Although seemingly obvious, this thesis brings to light 
the role that militias play in everyday life, how deeply entrenched into Iraqi society they have become, and explains 
why they cannot be simply wished away, as some U.S. policymakers would like to believe.  The thesis concludes with 
a discussion of the likelihood of U.S. success with the “surge” and what its impact on Iraq’s Sunni and Shi`a militias 




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
95 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Iraq, militia, Mahdi Army, JAM, Sadr, “surge,” sectarian 


















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
A COUNTRY DIVIDED: THE IMPACTS OF FRAGMENTED COMMUNITIES 
ON IRAQ’S GOVERNMENT 
 
Andrew P. Hubbard 
Captain, United States Army 
B.S., United States Military Academy, 2002 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 


























Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to answer the question “What effect do Iraq’s fragmented 
communities have on the government’s ability to consolidate control in the country?”  To 
answer this question, this thesis examines three underlying factors, essentially on the 
three levels of analysis (individual, communal, and state): first, why Iraqis are more loyal 
to their communities than to the central government; second, how the political militias in 
Iraq affect the security situation in the country (both adversely and positively), and lastly 
examines how Iraqi politics impacts the government’s ability to consolidate control over 
the country.  Although seemingly obvious, this thesis brings to light the role that militias 
play in everyday life, how deeply entrenched into Iraqi society they have become, and 
explains why they cannot be simply wished away, as some U.S. policymakers would like 
to believe.  The thesis concludes with a discussion of the likelihood of U.S. success with 
the “surge” and what its impact on Iraq’s Sunni and Shi`a militias is, some U.S. policy 
recommendations, and lastly some thoughts on democratization as a U.S. grand strategy.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Governments exist to provide security and other public goods, such as settle 
disagreements and set public policies, among countless other important tasks.  An 
effective government requires the consent of the people, and must reward that consent 
with good governance so that the populace comes to respect the authority and abilities of 
government.  This relationship simply does not exist between Iraq’s central government 
and its people.  The relationship actually seems to be worse now than ever before.  
To understand why the Iraqi government cannot consolidate control over its 
territory and population, it is necessary to study the factors that confront the central 
government.  A study of these factors provides many insights, but one common theme 
seems to stand out: communal loyalties.  To better understand the Iraqi government’s 
inability to consolidate control, it is necessary to look at the communities that make up 
Iraq, why they are more loyal to their community than to the government, and how these 
loyalties play out within the government.   
In addition to affecting the Iraqi government’s dynamics, community loyalties 
have resulted in the formation of militias along communal lines; these militias are 
possibly the most contentious issue facing Iraq today.  These three factors: individual 
loyalty to the community, the militias that formed as a result, and how communal 
loyalties affect the central government, organized in this study in three different chapters, 
representing three different levels of analysis, are all interrelated factors affecting the 
Iraqi government’s ability to consolidate control over the country.  Without an 
understanding of Iraq’s various communities, their interests and goals, and their 
interactions, the United States will not be able to understand the difficulties facing Iraq’s 
central government and possible ways to overcome those obstacles, if that is even 
possible at this late stage. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is generally agreed amongst the world powers that a government must have a 
monopoly on the use of force within its territory to be truly considered a state.  More 
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recently, authors have began to study why some states fail to achieve this “monopoly” on 
the use of force, citing a combination of weak central government and the fragmented 
communities within the state.  Further, some studies conclude that these communities 
should be given some degree of legitimization by the international community where they 
control territory.  Because Iraq has a democratic form of government, the literature 
reviewed will include some theories on democratic government. 
The theoretical study on the subject of the use of force within a state’s borders 
naturally begins with Max Weber, who says that: 
[A] state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory … the right 
to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only 
to the extent to which the state permits it.  The state is considered the sole 
source of the ‘right’ to use violence.1 
Nearly all international relations theories are built on this premise, which is the 
building block of modern international institutions and organizations. In a democracy, the 
legitimate use of force is especially limited to the state.   
According to Phillipe C. Schmitter, the civilian leadership in a democracy must 
have firm control over all military forces before a government in transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy can be considered mature.2  Furthermore, according to 
Thomas-Durell Young, in a democracy: 
[P]rofessional soldiers perform an essential service to the client, which is 
the state, their ‘management of violence’ can be considered legitimate 
today only in the context of service to the democratically elected 
government … Should an officer employ his or her skill of arms for 
personal benefit, then that officer is immediately transformed from 
society’s protector into a criminal threat to social stability.3   
 
                                                 
1 H.H Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1958), 8.  
2 Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes, Rhythms, Sequences, 
and Types,” in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., Transitions to Democracy (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995). 
3 Thomas-Durell Young, “Military Professionalism in a Democracy,” in Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott 
D. Tollefson, eds., Who Guards the Guardians and How (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2006), 
21. 
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Essentially, the authority to use force rests with the state.  This is especially true in a 
democracy because the government that makes the decision to use violence is legitimized 
by the people.  So in theory, the people themselves authorize their elected leaders to use 
violence.  Additionally, the soldiers who execute the use of force are legitimized by the 
people.  Any armed non-state actors in the democracy are therefore challengers to the 
state’s monopoly on the use of coercive force.   
So why do some states exist that do not have complete control over the use of 
violence within their territory?  Joel S. Migdal explains that: 
There [is] nothing inexorable about the move toward state     
predominance … Where an environment of conflict persists, states have 
been at loggerheads with kinship and ethnic groups and others.  Each has 
struggled to establish the currency of social control in what its leaders 
consider its domain; each has offered the wherewithal for people’s 
strategies of survival…In many cases, weblike communities have survived 
with social control dispersed among various social organizations having 
their own rules rather than centralized in the state or organizations 
authorized by the state.4  
Migdal goes on to examine the factors that explain why some states never achieve 
full control over the communities within their territory, and the implications this can have 
on the states’ policies.  Michael E. Brown expounds on this by describing how state 
weakness can lead to internal conflict, stating that: 
When state structures weaken, violent conflict often follows.  Power 
struggles between and among politicians and would-be leaders intensify.  
Regional leaders become increasingly independent and, should they 
consolidate control over military assets, become virtual warlords … 
individual [ethnic] groups within these states feel compelled to provide for 
their own defense; they have to worry about  incentives for groups to make 
independent military preparations grow.5    
 
                                                 
4 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1988), 40.   
5 Michael E. Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview,” in Daniel J. Kaufman, Jay M. 
Parker, and Kimberly C. Field, eds., Understanding International Relations (USA: McGraw-Hill 
Companies, 1999), 216.   
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Both of these authors examine weak states, Migdal by analyzing why weak states 
exist, and Brown by studying how a weak government contributes to internal conflict and 
the rise of armed non-state actors. The Geneva Conventions defines armed non-state 
actors as “groups that have a clear organizational structure and hierarchy (enabling 
leaders to control their subordinates) and which control sufficient territory to permit them 
to carry out substantial and concerted military efforts.”6  Thus, a state with a weak central 
government and intense ethnic tension creates the conditions for armed non-state actors. 
A recent study on the legality of non-state armed groups under international law 
concludes that international law actually gives these groups certain rights.  The study 
argues that: 1) “armed groups may assume the role of de facto government over territory 
under their effective control,” 2) “are by definition military entities in conflict with 
government or other forces and thus under obligations to follow certain international 
standards of warfare,” and 3) “are political entities with which negotiations over peaceful 
solutions may need to be conducted and they may also become parties to peace 
agreements.”7  Although many would disagree with these conclusions, they seem logical, 
but nonetheless give non-state actors some degree of legitimacy on the international 
stage, which is directly opposed to the state-centric model.  According to this conclusion, 
if a non-state group uses force to gain territory, they then have the right to act as a 
pseudo-government in the area they control, and be recognized as such by the 
international community.  To a central government trying to consolidate control over its 
territory, these rights granted to non-state actors can be problematic. 
A recent study conducted by Caroline Holmqvist and published by the Geneva 
Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces argued that armed non-state actors, 
although illegitimate by Weberian standards, should be negotiated with and influenced as 
a step towards democracy consolidation.  The study concludes that two concerns stem 
                                                 
6 Caroline Holmqvist, “Engaging Non-State Actors In Post Conflict Settings,” A. Bryden and H. 
Hänggi, eds., Security Governance and Post-conflict Peacebuilding, Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2005), 50. 
7 Hannes Berts, “Non-state Armed Groups Under International Law: Some Legal Aspects of Engaging 
With Non-State Armed Groups,” (Spring 2005), 46-47.  This study is Hannes Bert’s thesis; the work won 
the Swedish Institute for International Law’s award for best international law thesis. 
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from attempts to “govern” non-state actors.  The first is the relationship between the non-
state actor and the state; that by discoursing with the armed non-state actors, the 
international community gives legitimacy to an illegitimate actor.  Holmqvist recognizes 
this dilemma, stating that “[t]he state/non-state relationship is important both on a 
philosophical and practical level, and underlines the importance of addressing armed non-
state actors only as a complement to building up functioning state institutions, including 
judicial and penal systems.”8  The second is from a human security standpoint; 
Holmqvist recognizes that armed militias provide protection for the constituency that 
supports them, an important role that government forces are often unable to provide in a 
post-conflict environment.  The dilemma is that these groups pose a threat to peoples 
outside their constituency, and therefore must be dealt with before “effective 
reinstatement of a state monopoly on violence can take place.”9   
 In sum, there are two schools of thought on this issue.  The first is the Weberian 
view that only the state has the right to use violence.  Some that subscribe to this school 
of thought oppose even engaging with non-state actors to prevent conferring legitimacy.  
The weak-state explanation of armed non-state actors essentially says that a consolidated 
state is a rarity in the world, explains why this is so, and how it leads to armed groups.  
Lastly, the weak-state school of thought advocates engaging armed non-state actors as a 
step towards a state’s consolidation.   
 Iraq clearly does not qualify as a state by Weber’s standards, but rather falls into 
the weak state category that countries such as Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Sudan belong 
to.  Surprisingly, very little scholarly research based on the theoretical framework just 
described has been done to examine the relationship between the society and the central 
government in Iraq despite its prevalence in the national spotlight for the last few years.  
Countless articles and reports from Iraq cite “sectarian violence,” militias, and many of 
the underlying causes of Iraq’s difficulties, but do not fully analyze their implications.  
                                                 
8 Caroline Holmqvist, “Engaging Non-State Actors In Post Conflict Settings,” A. Bryden and H. 
Hänggi, eds., Security Governance and Post-conflict Peacebuilding, Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2005), 61.  
9 Ibid.  
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One of the few to analyze Iraq in these terms is Mark LeVine, who builds on Joel 
Migdal’s work, and applies it to Iraq and Palestine.  LeVine states that: 
Increasing the probability of violence [in Iraq] has been the high level of 
militarization of Iraqi society, and specifically the development of 
paramilitary arms by Shi'a movements … For their part, Sunni religious 
groups often have close ties with former Ba'thist military leaders and 
foreign fighters. Together, this dynamic of violence [has] produced a 
situation which would quite naturally frustrate the solidification of social 
and political solidarities while enabling religious movements and forces to 
become the most powerful social forces in the country.10   
Levine goes on to assert that because “chaos is the dominant social and political 
dynamic,” the Iraqi “state” is too weak to enforce its will without the help of the U.S. led 
coalition.11 
 Another scholar who saw the problems that militias posed to the Iraqi government 
is Michael Knights, who in 2004 predicted that “if current trends continue, the future 
Iraqi central government will not hold a monopoly on the use of force, but will instead be 
challenged by strong regional militias and a broad base of smaller local militias operating 
without any government mandate.”12  It is clear that this statement came to fruition, and 
remains true over two years later. 
 Anthony Shadid’s Night Draws Near is perhaps the most comprehensive study of 
the American led overthrow of Saddam and the cycle of events that resulted, given from 
the Iraqi perspective.  Although he does not explicitly analyze Iraq from the theoretical 
framework discussed thus far, Shadid sheds light on the various motivations for 
resistance to coalition presence, which is extraordinarily valuable to understanding the 
challenges that sectarianism presents for Iraq’s new central government.  Shadid asks one 
question that he claims Americans did not understand and Iraqis could not answer: “Who 
had the right to rule?”  Shadid claims that Iraqis could not agree on where the right came 
                                                 
10 Mark Levine, “Chaos, Globalization, and the Public Sphere: Political Struggle in Iraq and 
Palestine,” The Middle East Journal Journal 60, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 480.   
11 Ibid. 
12 Michael Knights, “Militias and the Monopoly of Force in Transitional Iraq,” The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, 16 March 2004. 
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from: God, money, tradition, law, or the gun.13  In the power vacuum that resulted after 
Saddam’s fall, Shadid reports on the groups often formed along sectarian lines that rose 
to fill that void, noting that “[t]here was a thuggish quality…that I would see often in 
Iraq, among the men who emerged to fill the vacuum left by Saddam’s demise and the 
American’s inaction.”14  Shadid sums up his observations of post-Saddam Iraq, saying 
that: 
Time and again, though, I was struck by the unintended consequences of 
Saddam’s fall and the country’s liberation from his rule.  There was the 
Shiite revival, unexpected in its fervor, empowering men like Muqtada 
Sadr and Ayatollah Sistani … Now, in the Sunni hinterland, I was seeing 
the first signs of a resurgent religion that refused to fall into easy 
categories, the tentative steps toward a redefinition of the community’s 
identity.15 
Shadid saw in the summer and fall of 2003 the beginnings of the sectarianism that 
plagues Iraq to this day. 
 Nir Rosen’s In the Belly of the Green Bird is a work in the same vein as Shadid’s, 
giving the Iraqi perspective to the U.S. occupation following Saddam’s fall, and offering 
insights to the problems that the Iraqi government faces.  Rosen chronicles not only the 
resistance to the coalition forces, but the beginnings of sectarian strife in 2004.  Rosen 
asserts that: 
Though Shia and Sunni leaders professed unity against the Americans and 
following the attacks in Karbala and Kadimiya, they hated each other.  As 
spring  wore on, Sunni and Shia newspapers grew more brazen in their 
attacks against each other … The Sunnis were scared, fearing the 
impending Shia takeover of Iraq if anything resembling a democratic 
election took place.  Shias did not fear the Sunnis; they just disliked 
them.16  
 
                                                 
13 Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 187. 
14 Ibid., 190. 
15 Ibid., 276. 
16 Nir Rosen, In the Belly of the Green Bird (New York, NY: Free Press, 2006), 135. 
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Rosen also noted the proliferation of private militias during his time in Iraq, noting that 
“every major Shia leader had one.”17  His book ends with Iraq heading towards civil war 
at the end of 2005. 
 Given this limited body of scholarly research on the topic, this study seeks to 
expand on the current scholars’ observations, and determine the impact that Iraq’s 
fragmented communities have on the central government’s ability to consolidate control 
over the country. 
B. HYPOTHESES  
 As one reads this study, the reader is bound to ponder whether the anarchic 
conditions that resulted after Saddam Hussein’s fall caused people to revert to their ethnic 
identity, or if the ethnic conflicts and tensions witnessed today stem from mutual ancient 
hatred that Saddam Hussein’s regime previously suppressed?  In other words, are ethnic 
identities the independent variable and the anarchic conditions the dependent, or vice 
versa?  In addition to these two hypotheses on ethnic conflict, there is another theory that 
explains violent action as the result of real or perceived grievances against another group.  
One scholar to advance this idea is Mohammed Hafez, who argues that “[t]he absence of 
institutional channels for conflict mediation and political contestation encourages 
rebellion by delegitimizing the ruling regime and disempowering moderate voices within 
the movement.”18  At face value, this may not seem applicable to the current study 
because Iraq does have a democratic government that has “institutional channels.”  
However, if the Sunnis see Iraq’s government as a puppet of the United States or the 
Shi’a majority, and feel that they have no real influence in the new government because 
they are the distinct minority, Hafez’s argument seems plausible as an explanation for the 
ethnic violence and the attacks against government forces.  In explaining how Iraq’s 
fragmented communities impact the government’s ability to consolidate control over the 
country, perhaps one or more of the aforementioned hypotheses will further illuminate 
the causes of the violence.  
                                                 
17 Nir Rosen, In the Belly of the Green Bird (New York, NY: Free Press, 2006), 125. 
18 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003), 
27. 
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C. OVERVIEW OF THIS STUDY’S SCOPE 
 In the power vacuum that resulted after Saddam Hussein’s ouster, numerous 
strong political parties sprang up to provide public goods and services, such as health 
care and education, but most of all to provide security for their constituents.  Three years 
after the regime change, a newly elected, and U.S. recognized government led by Nuri 
Kamil al-Maliki became the legal central authority in Iraq.  However, this government 
struggles to consolidate control over much of Iraq, including most of the Anbar province, 
but most noticeably the capital, Baghdad.  Many believe the political militias bear a great 
deal of blame for the cycle of violence that contributes to the inability of the government 
to control the country.  There is little doubt that there is some truth to these accusations, 
but a better question would explore whether the militias are the problem or just a 
symptom of the problem.  This study will endeavor to expand on the ideas put forth in the 
literature review, and answer the question “What effect do Iraq’s fragmented 
communities have on the government’s ability to consolidate control in the country?  
 This study will first lay some groundwork and background on the communities in 
Iraq and why citizens are more loyal to their respective communities than the central 
government, then study how these communal loyalties resulted in the various militias 
present in Iraq today, and how these militias affect the security situation, and lastly how 
Iraq’s divided communities within the central government affect the government’s ability 
to consolidate control over the country.  Community loyalties, militias, and the 
government’s composition are all interrelated factors affecting Iraq’s security situation.  
One can also look at this study as analyzing three different levels of analysis: the 
individual, community, and state level, representing Chapters II, III, and IV, respectively.   
 Before the militias can be analyzed, the communities from which they arise must 
first be briefly introduced.  For the purpose of this study, “community” will be defined as 
a “group of people having ethnic or cultural or religious characteristics in common.”19  
Therefore, scholars that analyze ethnic, culture, and religious identities will be used to 
help illuminate the dynamics at work in Iraq.  Iraq is home to three main communities: 
                                                 
19 Webster’s Online Dictionary.  http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definition/community  
(accessed 24 May 2007).   
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the Shi`a, the Sunnis, and the Kurds.  For the sake of brevity and relevance, the Kurds 
and their Peshmerga militia will not be included in this study because the Kurdish area of 
the country is not being contested, and at the present time it does not adversely impact the 
Iraqi government, although it could at some point in the future.  The communities that 
greatly affect the central government’s ability to consolidate control over the country, and 
which therefore will be discussed in this study, are the Shi`a and the Sunnis.20 
                                                 
20 According to Muslims, Mohammed was the last of God’s prophets (who included Abraham and 
Moses).  After Mohammed’s death in 632, the Muslim community disputed who should succeed him as the 
leader.  The first successors were Abu Bakr, Omar, Uthman, and lastly Ali.  Ali was the cousin of 
Mohammed, and whom Shi`a thought had the divine right to be the first successor to Mohammed, instead 
of the first three, who were close associates of Mohammed and whom those who would become Sunnis 
supported as the new leaders.  Ali married Mohammed’s daughter Fatima; after Ali’s murder the Shi`a 
believe that Ali’s sons, known as imams, had the right to be the religious leaders of Islam.  Ali’s second 
son, Hussein, is perhaps the most revered imam because of his heroics on the plains of Karbala in 680 A.D.  
Unfortunately, the question over who had the right to lead the Muslim community was never resolved, 
resulting in the split between the Shi`a, who thought Ali and his descendants had the divine right to rule, 
and the Sunni, who think the leader of Islam is more political, as they believed the first three successors to 
Mohammed were.  This disagreement spawned centuries of fighting and bickering between the two 
communities that persists to the present day. Cited in Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near, New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 2005, 191. 
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II. CONFLICTING LOYALTIES 
 Having defined communities above, it is now necessary to briefly examine why 
Iraqis are more loyal to their communities than to the central government.  On the face of 
it, most people probably understand why the Sunni population is disenfranchised with the 
central government, but why is this necessarily the case with the Shi`a as well, despite 
their dominance in the government?  This section will first trace why people in general 
associate first along societal lines, then explain how communities became the locus of 
loyalty in Iraq due to the power vacuum after Hussein’s fall from power—which will be 
introduced briefly because it is a common theme throughout this study—and lastly 
examine the extent of divisiveness amongst Iraq’s communities today. 
 Donald Rothchild notes that people mobilize around their societal identity in 
order to “compete effectively for state-controlled power, economic resources, positions, 
contracts, awards, and constitutional protections.”21  Besides access to power, people 
often have a close association with their society because it gives them a sense of unity 
and identity, particularly in stressful and uncertain circumstances.  Michael Armacost, the 
former president of the Brookings Institution, said that communities can offer “material 
benefits and [meet] such intangible needs as esteem and a sense of identity and 
purpose.”22  Samuel Huntington stated that “cultural identification is dramatically 
increasing in importance compared to other dimensions of identity … Along any single 
dimension, identity is usually most meaningful at the immediate face-to-face level.”23   
 In Iraq, these assertions certainly played out, as witnessed by the rise to 
prominence of strong social identities and networks, and the various political parties that 
sprang up in Iraq along social lines, such as the Sunni party United Concord Front 
[Jabhat al-Tawafuq] and the Shi`a party SIIC (which the Sadr bloc later allied with as 
                                                 
21 Donald S. Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 1997), 4.  Rothchild’s work is excellent, and holds some lessons that could be applied to Iraq. 
22 Ibid., vii.  
23 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New 
York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 128.  Regardless of one’s thoughts on Huntington’s thesis in the rest 
of the book, or even this statement’s applicability to the world at large, it certainly rings true as it applies to 
Iraq. 
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part of the larger United Iraqi Alliance (UIA)).  Although Iraqis eventually formed the 
aforementioned political parties, the drift to these societal political parties which 
currently compete for power in Iraq did not happen overnight, and may not have been 
inevitable.  Though Saddam Hussein certainly favored the Sunnis and suppressed the 
Kurds and Shi`a to a large degree, strife amongst Iraq’s communities was not necessarily 
the norm prior to Hussein’s ouster.  For example, intermarriage between Sunni and Shi`a 
was quite common in previous years—societal differences simply did not cause the level 
of angst then that they do today.  One Sunni resident of Adhamiyah, a Baghdad 
neighborhood, recently reflected on earlier times, saying that “nobody asked us if we 
were Shi'ite or Sunni, and we never thought to ask each other.  I have friends I didn't 
know were Shi'ite until quite recently.”24  This statement seems unusual, because if they 
were truly his friends, he would likely have known their sect.  Perhaps he knew of their 
sect but simply did not care until recently, or they were not really friends, but 
acquaintances.  It is possible that he was not being completely truthful with this 
statement, or some meaning was lost in the translation to English.  It is also quite possible 
that he was telling the truth.  In any event, before the societal political parties began 
vying for power, the people that formed them became more conscious of their respective 
identities as Shi`a or Sunni, in large part because communities fill the vacuum left after 
Saddam Hussein’s regime fell.  
 When Saddam Hussein’s regime fell, no government institutions remained that 
could effectively provide security, water, trash pick-up, electricity, or many of the other 
myriad of services that many people in the West take for granted.  In many cases, 
religious leaders, particularly Shi`a because they were better organized at first, essentially 
ran assistance programs out of their mosques, handing out food and other aid, as well as 
providing the most essential need, security.25  Because the occupying powers failed to 
provide these things, people became more apt to support their local tribal and religious 
leaders than the central power in Baghdad; this abrupt up-tick in tribal and religious  
                                                 
24 Bobby Ghosh, “Why They Hate Each Other,” Time, 5 March 2007,  
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1592849,00.html  (accessed 7 August 2007). 
25 “Iraq: Can Local Governance Save Central Government,” International Crisis Group, 27 October 
2004, 14. 
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loyalties alarmed the CPA, which caused them to delay local elections out of fear that 
religious and tribal leaders would come to power—the implications of which will be 
discussed later.26   
 Unfortunately, this trend continues to the present day in part because the central 
government is still grossly ineffective at providing essential services to its people.  LTC 
Jeff Peterson, a battalion commander stationed south of Baghdad, reasserted the 
assessment that societal militias and mosques are still better at fulfilling service needs 
than the central government, saying that “[t]hey just have to do better than the 
government.  Anything above zero is a better alternative.”27  In Sadr City, the Shi`a are 
loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr’s organization for much the same reason—it provides services 
the government does not.  One resident stated that the locals in Sadr City “get no help 
from Maliki.  Only Sayyid Moqtada helps us.”28  In addition to giving out food and other 
necessities to the poor, Sadr’s organization runs Sadr City’s police, hospitals, morgues, 
trash collection, and even conducts weddings.  The Sadr Bureau also provides cooking 
fuel at a reduced price to the poor—at 4,000 dinars ($3.15) per canister instead of the 
market price of 24,000 dinars.29   
 When I patrolled Sadr City in early 2005, my unit frequented sewage sub-stations 
(which ran pumps to keep the sewage moving through the sewers towards the treatment 
plant, so that it would not back up into the street, although it frequently did) to ensure that 
they were in working order.  Conversing with one friendly sewage sub-station operator, I 
was shocked to learn that each sewage sub-station in Sadr City had its own Sadr Bureau 
overseer to make sure the pumps stayed in operation—the Sadr Bureau was essentially 
doing the same thing that we were—trying to prevent sewage from backing up into the 
street.   
                                                 
26 Iraq: Can Local Governance Save Central Government,” International Crisis Group, 27 October 
2004, 15.  
27 Greg Jaffe, “In Iraq, An Officer’s Answer To Violence: Build A Wall,” The Wall Street Journal, 5 
April 2007, 1. 
28 Sudarsan Raghavan, “An Enclave Of Normalcy In Fearful Baghdad,” The Washington Post, 27 
March 2007, 1. 
29 Ibid. 
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  The Sadr Bureau is also heavily involved in absorbing Shi`a refugees fleeing from 
sectarian violence in mixed neighborhoods, providing them with food, shelter, and other 
needs.  A Sadr Bureau official stated that all of the services that they provided to these 
refugees were “the duty of the government.  This is not our duty… Where is the 
Displacement Ministry? Where is the Human Rights Ministry?30  Because organizations 
along societal lines, such as the Sadr bloc, continue to provide essential services better 
than the central government, Iraqis are more loyal to their communities than ever before. 
 Unfortunately, the societal violence between the Sunni and Shi`a (the causes of 
which are discussed later) has exacerbated the situation by further entrenching people’s 
ethnic identities, which makes the Iraqi government’s efforts to create a national sense of 
identity and unity in order to overcome the violence extremely difficult.  On 31 August 
2005, a stampede ensued amongst Shi`a pilgrims on a bridge over the Tigris River in 
Baghdad, causing some to jump into the water in an effort to save themselves.  Sunnis 
from neighboring Adhamiya, a Sunni neighborhood on the eastern bank of the river, dove 
into the water to help the pilgrims—one of them, Othman al-Obeidi, saved six victims 
before drowning from exhaustion.  Although almost 1,000 Shi`a pilgrims died that day, 
Shi`a leaders applauded the Sunnis’ efforts, while Sunni leaders used the event to prove 
that they held no ill-will towards the Shi`a population.31   
 Nearly two years later, loyalties and attitudes regarding communities have 
completely changed.  One Sunni resident who himself rescued Shi`a from the Tigris 
River recently stated that al-Obeidi “wasted his life for those animals,” further declaring 
that “[i]f I see a Shi'ite child about to drown in the Tigris now, I will not reach my hand 
out to save him.”32  How has ethnic hatred gone so mainstream in Iraq, and become so 
pervasive?  This is a question not easily answered, but which may become clearer during 
the course of this study.  Individual Iraqis are certainly more loyal to their communities 
now than prior to Saddam Hussein’s departure, which created a government vacuum that 
                                                 
30 Sudarsan Raghavan, “An Enclave Of Normalcy In Fearful Baghdad,” The Washington Post, 27 
March 2007, 1. 
31 Bobby Ghosh, “Why They Hate Each Other,” Time, 5 March 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1592849,00.html  (accessed 7 August 2007). 
32 Ibid. 
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communities filled; this engendered Iraqis loyalty to their communities.  These 
communities in turn began to struggle for power in and influence in the new central 
government, which in part helped birth the societal conflict witnessed today.  Donald 
Rothchild prophetically notes in his ground-breaking work on ethnic conflict in Africa 
that as: 
ethnic leaders pursue their separate interests by “playing the ethnic card” 
among  peoples who are conscious of their ethnic identity, they can entrap 
their constituents (and themselves) in a deadly encounter from which there 
may be no escape.  Fearful of collective insecurity unless the group hangs 
together and takes precautionary measures, the ethnic group acts 
aggressively toward its neighbor.  Thus, even though the antagonists and 
the society at large would benefit from mutual cooperation, the defection 
of leaders from such action … can preclude join problem solving … In 
worst-case situations, when leaders and their constituents perceive their 
political and strategic goals to be incompatible with those of their 
adversary and they become entrapped in a situation of ungovernability, 
conflict can escalate to a dangerous level.33 
By far the most important aspect that the communities furnished for their constituents 
was security, which caused the formation of militias, the implications of which will be 
discussed in the next chapter.    
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III. PLAGUE AND PARADOX: MILITIAS IN IRAQ 
 The next chapter of this study analyzes the militias currently operating in Iraq and 
how they affect the central government’s ability to consolidate control in the country, 
focusing on one of the best known and influential, the Mahdi Militia.  The militias in Iraq 
are formed along community lines, and are a direct result of Iraqis having greater loyalty 
to their community than the state, as discussed in the previous chapter; one can think of 
this chapter as focusing on the community as a level of analysis, where the previous 
chapter focused at the individual level.  These militias are the subject of much debate in 
the United States government because they are seen as spoilers in Iraq, and detrimental to 
the Iraqi government’s campaign to consolidate control.  This is a valid accusation, and 
will be discussed here; however, the militias also provide security for their constituents, 
and therefore are seen by many Iraqis as protectors, and indispensable given the current 
security environment.  This chapter will focus on this Faustian bargain the militias in Iraq 
offer, which makes the militias in Iraq extraordinarily difficult to get rid of, particularly 
now that they are so firmly entrenched in some parts of Iraq, both geographically and 
sociologically. 
 Often brutalized under Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime, the Shi`a comprise 60% 
of Iraq’s population.  There are two major Shi`a militias operating in Iraq.  The first is 
Muqtada Al-Sadr’s militia, often referred to as the Mahdi Army, the Mahdi Militia, or 
Jaysh Al-Mahdi.  These names all refer to the same group.  Muqtada Al-Sadr is the fourth 
son of the late Ayatollah Sadiq Al-Sadr, an extremely popular Shi`a leader throughout the 
1990s who Saddam Hussein’s regime murdered in February 1999 along with his two 
eldest sons because of the threat they posed.34  Sadiq’s popularity was one factor that 
gave Muqtada the great deal of influence that he did in the power vacuum that developed 
following the U.S. overthrow of Saddam’s regime.  The other factor is the 
disenfranchisement of young, poor, urban Shi`as that saw the new political process as 
dominated by returning exiles.35   
                                                 
34 “Muqtada Al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabilizer,” International Crisis Group, 11 July 2006, 4. 
35 Ibid., 7. 
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 Against this backdrop, Muqtada formed his own pseudo government and army to 
provide a voice for his constituency.  Muqtada expressed hostility to the occupation 
because he saw it as prolonging “the oppression that had begun with the U.S. backed 
sanctions which had disproportionately hurt impoverished Shiites.”36  The United States 
returned the hostility in kind; this, combined with the disastrous, well-documented 
reconstruction efforts of the CPA, Muqtada’s follower’s disenfranchisement with the 
political process, and poor economic outlook, set the stage for confrontation.37  The 
Mahdi Militia led two revolts against the American forces that witnessed intense fighting 
in Sadr City, Najaf, and Karbala.  L. Paul Bremmer’s order to close Muqtada Al-Sadr’s 
newspaper, al Hawza, for its “false articles” that “incited violence” sparked the first 
revolt in April 2004; this was followed by another revolt in August.38  Despite a truce 
that ended the fighting, the Mahdi Army remains a potent force, both politically and 
militarily.  Kenneth Pollack noted that: 
His militiamen switched from confronting U.S. forces to filling the 
vacuum in the  large swaths of southern Iraq where few (or no) U.S. troops 
were present.  He developed a social-services network that could provide 
the average Iraqi with the protection, medicine, supplies, assistance and 
even money and jobs that they so desperately needed.39 
As a result of these services, Sadr’s political arm has become increasingly popular, 
winning 30 of 275 seats in the parliamentary elections held in 2005.40 
 The second major Shi`a militia is the Badr Corps, which is the paramilitary arm of 
the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), formerly known as the Supreme Council for 
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), another popular Shi`a political party in the new 
                                                 
36 “Muqtada Al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabilizer,” International Crisis Group, 11 July 2006, 10. 
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government.  The SCIRI party has strong ties to Iran, as it was founded there during the 
Iran-Iraq war.41  Many Iraqis suspect SCIRI of trying to bring Iraq under Iran’s influence; 
in any event, Badr Corps and SCIRI personnel hurried across the Iraqi border from Iran 
to begin exerting influence amongst Iraqi Shi`as after Saddam Hussein’s government fell.  
The Badr/SCIRI groups have been very successful in gaining popularity in Iraq due to 
their high degree of organization and resources, resulting in the SCIRI party gaining 
enough influence in the January 2005 elections to have a party member, Bayan Jaber 
Solagh, appointed as the new Minister of Interior.42  Under his leadership, Iraqis have 
widely accused the Ministry of Interior of sectarian violence because they believe that 
Solagh allowed Badr members to infiltrate the security forces and carry out their agenda. 
 The Sunnis are not nearly as organized as either the Badr Corps or the Mahdi 
Militia, but are rather more loosely affiliated insurgents that share some of the same 
goals.  In the August 2006 quarterly report to Congress, the Department of Defense noted 
that Sunni resistance elements “include Rejectionists—many of whom were members of, 
or associated with, the former regime—and terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
Ansar al Sunnah, and other smaller groups.”43  Unfortunately, the recent cycle of 
violence in Iraq has caused some Sunnis to seek out the insurgents for security from the 
Shi`a militias. 
A. THE MILITIA’S DESTABILIZING EFFECTS 
 Since their appearance in Iraq after the U.S. led coalition toppled Saddam 
Hussein’s oppressive regime, the U.S. and many others have accused the militias as a 
debilitating factor in the Iraqi government’s progress towards consolidated control over 
the country by causing violence and civil unrest.  Militias contribute to the Iraq’s 
violence and civil unrest in three ways: 1) their overt and covert hostility to the coalition 
                                                 
41 United States Government Accountability Office, “Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security 
Situation,” 11 September 2006, 11.  SIIC also is the closest US Shi`a ally in Iraq, as they were the only 
religious group that supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
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and the central government’s goals, 2) their infiltration of the Iraqi Security Forces, and 
3) their suspicion of operating “death squads” to carry out sectarian violence.  
 As alluded to briefly above, Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia posed the first major 
problems for the U.S.-led coalition.  He first raised eyebrows in July 2003 when he 
denounced the Interim Government as “lackeys of the occupation,” and then set about 
establishing his parallel government, complete with its paramilitary wing, Jaysh Al-
Mahdi, which proceeded to take control of Shi`a dominated territory such as Thawra 
(also known as Saddam City, which he promptly renamed Sadr City).44  The Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) understandably saw this as a significant threat and challenge 
to the legitimacy of both its power and the Interim Government’s progress.   
 Things began to come to a head in March 2004 when Sadr gave a sermon that 
declared that the September 11th attacks on the United States were “a miracle and a 
blessing from God.”45  The situation neared the boiling point when Bremmer ordered a 
Sadrist newspaper closed on 28 March 2004 after it reprinted the sermon.  On 3 April, the 
coalition arrested one of Muqtada’s close advisors, Mustafa al-Yaqubi, for suspected 
involvement in the murder of Abd al-Majid al-Khoei, a religious leader who worked 
closely with the U.S. coalition.46  When the U.S. issued an arrest warrant for Muqtada 
himself on 4 April, fighting erupted. 
 The uprising caught the U.S. forces completely off-guard.  Major General Pete 
Chiarelli, the commander of the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division, remembers: 
At about 1705, 2-5 Cav [2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment], 1st Cavalry 
Division, was completing its transition with the 2d ACR [2d Armored 
Cavalry Regiment]. 2-5 Cav was mid-stride in transferring authority when 
a firefight broke out in Sadr City.  Eight Soldiers were killed and 51 were 
wounded.47 
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Fighting also broke out in Karbala, Najaf, and other Shi`a dominated areas, waxing and 
waning until culminating in the stand-off at the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf, to which 
Ayatollah Sistani negotiated a peaceful solution.  Hundreds of Sadr’s militiamen died 
during the year’s fighting with coalition forces; but even with a negotiated truce, one U.S. 
State Department official may have put it best when he said “Maybe they'll leave the 
mosque, but they won't bend their swords into ploughshares.”48  
 Although the Mahdi Militia’s uprising in 2004 stemmed from civil unhappiness in 
some parts of the Shi`a community, it also furthered the civil strife and violence in Iraq 
that persists to the present day.  By uprising against the interim government and the 
coalition, the Mahdi Militia set an example and created a legacy of violence towards any 
U.S.-backed central government in Baghdad that still reverberates amongst Shi`a groups.  
In addition to this, Muqtada al-Sadr’s uprising triggered a second-order affect opposed to 
his interests: it shifted the U.S. military’s attention from the Sunni insurgency (in April 
2004, Marines began earnest fighting in Fallujah) to the Shi`a militias. 
 Although the Badr Corps and the Mahdi Militia have many similar, overarching 
goals, they still compete for political power, as the events in Amarah in October 2006 
demonstrate.  On 20 October 2006, approximately 800 black-clad Mahdi Militiamen 
armed with AK-47s and RPGs took control of Amarah, a city of 750,000 situated at the 
head of the marsh lands, about 30 miles from the Iranian border.  The Mahdi Militia’s 
move to take control of the SIIC stronghold city stemmed from the death of Qassim al-
Tamim, the provincial head of police intelligence and a leading Badr Corps member.  The 
Badr Corps blamed the Mahdi Militia for the killing, and in retaliation kidnapped the 
local Mahdi Militia commander’s teenage brother, demanding that the Mahdi Militia 
commander hand over those responsible for Tamim’s killing to secure his brother’s 
return.  The kidnapping spurred the Mahdi Militia to storm the city, destroying three 
SIIC-influenced police stations in the process; the Mahdi Militia later withdrew and 
allowed the Iraqi Army and police forces to reenter the city under a truce brokered by 
Muqtada al-Sadr.49   
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 More recently, the Shi`a militias in Basra have fought to gain political control of 
that city and possibly of southern Iraq, and the significant spoils that come with it—the 
Basra region contains approximately two-thirds of the country’s known oil reserves, and 
its sole reliable conduit to export oil.  The gradual British withdrawal from Basra created 
a vacuum into which the militias, particularly the Mahdi Militia and the Badr Corps, are 
increasingly inserting themselves.50  Although Vice-President Cheney once thought of 
Basra as a place “where things are going pretty well,”51 that is far from the case today.  
The International Crisis Groups recently summed up the situation in Basra: 
Basra’s political arena remains in the hands of actors engaged in bloody 
competition for resources, undermining what is left of governorate 
institutions and coercively enforcing their rule.  The local population has 
no choice but to seek protection from one of the dominant camps.  Periods 
of stability do not reflect greater governing authority so much as they do a 
momentary – and fragile – balance of interests or of terror between rival 
militias.52  
 The events in Amarah and Basra demonstrate many things: first, that the ISF are 
not powerful enough in all places to stand up to a concerted militia attack, second, that 
despite their similar communal backgrounds, the Badr Corps and the Mahdi Militia still 
struggle for political influence and control, and most importantly, that lawlessness still 
reigns in Iraq, further delegitimizing the central government and their ability to 
consolidate control over the country. 
B. THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS 
 As described above, the militias in Iraq formed predominantly as a response to the 
insecurity and government vacuum that resulted from Saddam Hussein’s regime collapse.  
Although some militias, such as the Badr Corps, appeared to have a pre-planned entrance 
into Iraq contingent upon Saddam’s demise, most developed from legitimate security and 
government service concerns.  No discussion of the militia’s rise to prominence in Iraq 
can be complete without an objective analysis of the United States’ “contributions” to the 
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problems that allowed the militia’s popularity to soar.  Because respected scholars and 
authors have covered the U.S.’s initial failures to provide security and fill the government 
vacuum, this section will be brief.  Other than the most obvious action, removing Saddam 
Hussein and allowing religious leaders to exert their influence over the Iraqi people, the 
most immediate U.S. actions that set the conditions for the militias’ rise are Paul 
Bremmer and the CPA’s unwillingness to listen to the legitimate concerns of the Iraqi 
people—which made the U.S. further appear as an occupier rather than a liberator—and 
the overly aggressive U.S. response to the Sadr movement.53  The other inexcusable U.S. 
failures, such as disbanding the Iraqi Army and de-Baathification, and failing to stop the 
rampant looting and provide adequate security, doubtlessly spurred the Sunni insurgency 
and made establishing an Iraqi government more difficult; but were not significant, 
immediate contributors to militias.  
 The major U.S. failure with respect to the militia movement was to not recognize 
the political grievances of the Shi`a population.  Anthony Shadid interviewed Muqtada 
al-Sadr soon after Saddam Hussein’s fall, and summarized Sadr’s followers’ grievances, 
noting that Sadr and his men did not trust the United States because of their failure to 
support the 1991 uprisings.  More immediate though, Sadr’s followers “erupted in anger 
when the United States made clear in May, after the war, that it would lead an 
occupation; the Arabic word, ihtilal, is shadowed by humiliation, notions of resistance, 
and still resonant memories of the occupation by the British.”54  Given the language of 
Paul Bremmer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, it is not surprising that 
the Iraqi people would have these feelings.  On 16 September 2003, Bremmer told a 
group of new Iraqi Ministers that “Like it or not—and it’s not pleasant being occupied, or 
being the occupier, I might add—the Coalition is still the sovereign power here.”55 
 The CPA (and by extension the United States, although after reading State of 
Denial, it is not clear how involved the executive branch of the government was in the 
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CPA’s decision making cycle) also caused the Iraqi population, and Sadr’s movement in 
particular, significant concern that “the United States would deprive Sadr and his men of 
power and handpick a government from the once exiled parties of [Ayad] Allawi…that it 
had supported.56  Muqtada al-Sadr stated that “the U.S. will ignore the opinion of the 
Iraqi people and it will compose the new government according to its own desires…I 
don’t want the chair of the government because it will be controlled by the U.S., and I 
don’t want to be controlled by the U.S.”57  This is also a legitimate complaint, as the Iraqi 
people who suffered under Saddam Hussein had little say in the CPA’s decision to 
impose a governing council, which had a Shi`a majority, but consisted primarily of exiles 
who had opposed Saddam.  Although the Shi`a initially supported the council, as its lack 
of power became apparent, they increasingly saw it as a U.S. puppet.58  Lastly, Shadid 
claims that “Sadr’s lieutenants railed against the importation into Iraq of a corrupt, 
materialistic culture exemplified...in particular [by] the United States.”59   
 Although the last reason was no doubt significant to the religious Shi`a who 
rejected certain Western values, the first two factors, the imposition of an occupation and 
the governing council, both stemmed from their main grievance—the lack of 
representation and a voice in the new Iraq.  All of these issues, however, served to 
mobilize their grassroots movement that eventually formed the Mahdi Militia, arguably 
the most powerful militia in Iraq today. 
 The U.S. response to the Sadr movement is the second significant, direct action 
that greatly contributed to the militia’s rise.  As already noted above, the CPAs’ 
responses to the Sadr movement—most significantly by closing Sadr’s newspaper—
directly led to the armed conflict from April-August 2004.  Although the Coalition Forces 
crushed the uprising militarily, Sadr and his militia gained significant political 
recognition and support by standing up to the U.S. occupation.   
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 The U.S. military’s actions also contributed to the Mahdi Militia’s popularity rise 
amongst Iraqis even before Sadr’s 2004 uprising.  On 13 August 2003, a U.S. helicopter 
flying over Sadr City removed a black Sadrist flag flying atop a radio tower, infuriating 
the residents of Sadr City, who compared it to their oppression under Saddam.60  A Sadr 
City sheik proclaimed that “[y]esterday Saddam the infidel attacked our holy sites and the 
people of this holy city, and now the Americans do the same thing.  So what is the 
difference between Saddam and America?”61  Whether the U.S. soldiers acted under their 
commander’s guidance or took the initiative to remove the flag on their own is uncertain 
—but like nearly every other aspect of American involvement in Iraq, the law of 
unintended consequences took over.  This action and similar real and perceived affronts 
made the Mahdi Militia and the Sadr movement as a whole increasingly popular.  The 
U.S. failure to effectively listen to the Iraqi peoples’ desires by giving them real 
representation in the government and the military’s actions towards the Shi`a, intended or 
not, contributed to the militias’ rise to prominence.  
C. INFILTRATION  
1. The Ministry of Interior 
 After the overt fighting between coalition forces and the Mahdi Militia ended, 
both the Mahdi Militia and the Badr Corps recognized that the political process was the 
best means to accomplish their goals.  As noted above, after the January 2005 elections, 
SCIRI’s Bayan Jaber Solagh became the Minister of the Interior, and therefore in charge 
of Iraq’s police forces.  Under his leadership, many Iraqis have accused the police forces 
of being infiltrated by Badr Brigade and Mahdi Militia members, who subsequently assist 
in sectarian killings.  In November 2005, further proof of misconduct on the part of the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) came to light when U.S. forces uncovered a covert prison on 
the Karrada peninsula run by Shi`a police forces which held almost exclusively held 
tortured Sunni prisoners.62  In my experience in Sadr City, nearly every police station 
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exhibited evidence of the Mahdi Militia’s presence in the form of violent Sadrist 
propaganda.  My unit frequently caught the local police escorting Mahdi Militia members 
around the city during curfew hours.  Whether they did this out of fear or support for the 
Mahdi Militia cause was unclear, although a combination of the two was quite likely. 
 The situation has apparently worsened; the chief of police of western Baghdad, 
Brig. Gen. Salah al-Ani, recently said that the police are “working for the militias or to 
put money in their pocket.”63  A U.S. military report asserts that a station commander in 
the al-Amil neighborhood “is afraid to report suspected militia members in his 
organization due to fear of reprisals.”64  This report seems to suggest that even if the 
police are not actively involved in the sectarianism (and the majority may not be), they 
often feel powerless to stop it.  A resident of the Sha`b district in Baghdad recounted a 
recent incident in which police came upon a group of armed men setting up a mortar.  
When the men showed their Mahdi Militia identification cards, the police stepped aside 
and watched the militiamen shoot three mortar rounds at the Abu Hanifa mosque in 
Adhamiyah, one of the most sacred Sunni shrines in Baghdad.65 
 A U.S. Army MP unit currently tasked with training Sadr City’s police forces 
recently sought to do a joint patrol with the local police, but had to talk the police into 
doing the patrol with them; the police initially resisted the patrol out of fear of being seen 
by the Mahdi Militia.  This scenario is the same one that my unit experienced in Sadr 
City in 2005 and the unit before us in 2004; nothing seems to have changed.  Staff 
Sergeant Toby Hansen observed that “eventually, when we leave, they're going to police 
their own city. They're going to do it their way.”66  This sentiment is very much in 
harmony with viewpoint I had after a year in Iraq, that whether U.S. forces left Sadr City  
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in two weeks or in two years, the results would be no different.  In fact, things have 
changed since my unit patrolled Sadr City—the Sadr Bureau and the Mahdi Militia have 
gained more influence and strength. 
 It is clear from numerous reports such as these that the militias have infiltrated the 
police forces, they often carry out sectarian or political violence, and lastly that 
policemen who yearn to do the right thing are too afraid to report corruption.  A recent 
Congressional Research Service report mildly stated that the “blending of Shiite militias 
with many units under the control of the Iraqi Interior Ministry has caused many Sunni 
Arabs to distrust Iraq’s police forces.”67  In response to U.S. pressure, Prime Minister al-
Maliki recently relieved Rasheed Fleyah and Mahdi Sabeh, two senior Ministry of 
Interior generals in charge of public order and commando brigades who remained from 
the interim government, under which the polarization of the police forces likely began.68  
What effect these changes in leadership will bring remains to be seen; given the extent of 
the police force’s infiltration and the resulting mistrust on the part of the Iraqi people, it is 
likely that the damage done may take decades to repair.  The Iraqi police forces in their 
current state therefore not only make the government seem more illegitimate, but make 
the government’s efforts to consolidate control over the country much more difficult. 
2. The Ministry of Defense   
 Although the militia influence is much stronger in the Iraqi police forces, the Iraqi 
Army is not free from militia influence either.  Recent efforts to curb sectarian violence 
in Baghdad brought societal loyalties within the Iraqi Army to the forefront.  Many Iraqi 
soldiers operating in the capital are Shi`a, recruited from local neighborhoods; this is 
particularly true in eastern Baghdad, where Sadr City is located.  Lieutenant Colonel 
Greg Watt, a senior U.S. military adviser to one of the two Iraqi Army divisions that 
operate in Baghdad, noted that “[f]rom my perspective, you can't make a distinction 
between Iraq army Shi’ites and the religious militias. You have a lot of soldiers and 
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family members swayed and persuaded by the religious leadership.”69  These assertions 
played out on the ground, where U.S. advisors repeatedly saw Shi`a Iraqi Army soldiers 
fail to perform their duties property in eastern Baghdad.  Tasked with operating a 
checkpoint to prevent the passage of armed militia or other suspicious personnel, U.S. 
advisors watched as the soldiers allowed many cars and even an ambulance full of armed 
militiamen pass.70   
 These problems are not particular to Baghdad; Majid Sari, an Iraqi MoD adviser 
in Basra, laid the issues bare.  “Here's the problem…They're taking money from the state, 
they're taking clothes from the state, they're taking vehicles from the state, but their 
loyalty is to the parties.  Whoever disagrees, the next day you'll find them dead in the 
street.”71  Though it is widely accepted that the Iraqi Army is not nearly as infiltrated as 
the police forces, the influences are still present.  My experiences in Sadr City 
substantiate this; the Iraqi Army battalion we worked with was predominantly locally 
recruited, yet the soldiers exhibited a much higher degree of loyalty to the government 
than did the local police, although societal influences were certainly noticeable.   
 Militia infiltration into both the police forces and the Iraqi Army poses a problem 
for the central government because these forces are not seen as legitimate, viable forces 
by all Iraqis due to their questionable loyalties.  Until the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 
represent the interests of the central government by carrying out their instructions and 
intents objectively, sectarianism in Iraq will continue, and the central government in its 
current form will not consolidate control over the country. 
D. “DEATH SQUADS” 
 By far the most significant militia contribution to civil unrest and violence is the 
much publicized “sectarian violence” carried out by “death squads.”  Numerous sources 
blame some of the sectarian killing on the Ministry of Interior’s police forces, as 
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discussed above.  However, much of the violence carried out along societal lines is 
outside the realm of the MOI or the MOD, and is more specific to the militias.  Although 
sectarian killings have been a somewhat regular occurrence since Saddam Hussein’s 
demise, the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra (likely by Sunni terrorists) began 
a ruthless cycle of violence that continues to this day.72   In a August 2006 report, the 
U.S. Department of Defense succinctly summed up the sectarian violence, stating that: 
Sectarian tensions increased over the past quarter, manifested in an 
increasing number of execution-style killings, kidnappings, and attacks on 
civilians, and increasing numbers of internally displaced persons. Sunni 
and Shi’a extremists,  particularly al- Qaeda in Iraq and rogue elements of 
Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM), are increasingly interlocked in retaliatory violence 
and are contesting control of ethnically mixed areas to expand their 
existing areas of influence.73 
The United Nations (UN) estimated that between January and June 2006, 14,300 Iraqi 
civilians suffered hostile deaths, most of which stemmed from sectarian violence carried 
out in the Baghdad area.74 
 The manner in which militias carry out the sectarian violence, and how much 
control over the violence the militias actually have, is somewhat of a mystery.  A senior 
coalition intelligence analyst in Iraq noted that the Mahdi Militia death squads often 
receive a target list that gives the soon to be victim’s name and address.  These groups 
vary in their composition, but most include special forces, intelligence personnel, and 
punishment committee members—who often come complete with a cleric that 
administers sentences.75  My unit’s experience in Sadr City supports this assertion; our 
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head.  The patrols that found the bodies frequently questioned local citizens, who usually 
cited the “punishment committees” as the guilty party; one patrol even rescued a bound 
hostage from a car’s trunk. 
 The violence conducted by the militias is often impersonal; but are more often tit-
for-tat reprisals.  The New York Times reported a story featuring an individual named 
Ibrahim, whose brother and nephew were murdered by Sunni gunmen in September.  At 
the funeral, Mahdi Militiamen approached Ibrahim and offered to kill Sunnis to avenge 
the deaths.  Ibrahim declined, but said, “If I find who killed my brother, I will tell Mahdi 
Army to kill him.”76  Although Ibrahim declined the Mahdi Militia’s reprisal offer, this 
mind-set is typical, and causes the indiscriminate sectarian violence currently plaguing 
Iraq, particularly Baghdad.   
 Another issue surrounding the various militias’ involvement with the “death 
squads” is the degree of control the militias have.  Although many of these squads claim 
to operate under the Mahdi Militia banner, they in fact have little allegiance to the 
organization, and more closely resemble armed gangs; additionally, the Mahdi Militia 
itself is often divided on numerous issues, although they all give lip service to Muqtada 
al-Sadr’s leadership.  Mahdi Militia commanders claim that they do not need permission 
to conduct sectarian attacks, saying “We don’t need to ask Muqtada because there is a 
very clear fatwa that authorizes the execution of nawasib.  All we need to do is read 
Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr’s chapter on jihad.”77  Indeed, in a recent Crisis Group 
interview, a Mahdi Militia company commander admitted that he had killed over 600 
Sunnis, not really delineating between the general population and legitimate targets.78  To 
address this, Muqtada al-Sadr fired 41 Mahdi Militia members linked to “illegal 
activities;” despite this, sectarian violence continues.79  Even though the Mahdi Militia 
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does not have absolute control over the groups that often carry out sectarian violence 
under their banner, rightly or wrongly, Iraqis and coalition forces widely blame and 
associate them with the attacks.  
 It is clear by Western standards that Iraq’s militias make the central government’s 
effort to consolidate control over the country extremely challenging.  The militias affect 
the central government’s ability to consolidate control in three important and somewhat 
related ways.  First, the militias’ opposition to the coalitions’ and central governments’ 
political goals results in their overt and covert violence directed at the Iraqi Security 
Forces and U.S. forces.  This violence not only hampers the coalition’s long-term 
reconstruction efforts, but poses a serious challenge to the objective legitimacy of the 
Iraqi government because the central government exercises no control over the militias’ 
actions.  Second, all Iraqi citizens do not trust the government’s security forces because 
they question the ISF’s loyalties due to the political militia’s infiltration.  Lastly, the 
militias are widely believed to operate “death squads” that carry out attacks along societal 
lines, thereby further fragmenting Iraq’s communities and making the central 
government’s attempts to gain control and reconcile differences ever more difficult.  The 
Iraqi government’s inability to halt any of these militia-sponsored actions makes the 
central government illegitimate in the Iraqi people’s eyes; therefore, the militias are a 
significant destabilizing force. 
E.  COUNTERPOINT: SERVE AND PROTECT 
 Although the militias receive their fair share of criticism from the United States 
and others, mostly the Sunnis, for creating havoc in Iraq, they also provide a valuable 
public good for their constituency—security.  Like a neighborhood watch, the Mahdi 
Militia, Badr Corps, and other militias try to protect their own territory against attacks by 
outsiders; in the case of the Shi`a militias, Sunni suicide bombers.  Because they do 
provide this valuable service that the government can not, many Shi`as argue that the 
central government cannot disband the militias without first addressing the reason for 
their existence by eliminating the mostly Sunni threat; the Sunnis counter with basically 
the same argument about their organized bands of insurgents.  Again, the existence of the 
militias goes back to the power and government services vacuum that resulted after 
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Saddam’s demise.  As Qasim Dawood, the former national security minister under 
interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi stated, the “support of the militias within the Shiite 
community comes from the failure of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense 
and the coalition forces to provide security…The creation of these militias comes as a 
reaction.”80  Sheikh Fartusi echoed these sentiments in the spring of 2003, stating that 
after Saddam’s fall, “[t]he first thing we did was to reassure people that the area is secure 
and stable, then restore social services, traffic, power, then restore law and prevent people 
from looting and stealing.  Muqtada was in charge … [and] gave orders.”81 
 For example, a senior Iraqi judge in the criminal court system recently stated that 
“[r]ight now I support the presence of the Mahdi Army ... I know this is unacceptable in 
law, in politics, in society, but in this unusual time we are living in, this is the reality.”82  
When educated citizens such as this judge carry these sentiments, it is unlikely that the 
government will be able to disband the militias anytime soon.  My unit’s experience in 
Sadr City somewhat reflects these beliefs.  Although often at odds, our unit and the 
Mahdi Militia shared one of the same basic goals: to prevent outside attacks, such as 
suicide bombs, within Sadr City.  We joked on the staff that we should call the Sadr 
Bureau (Sadr’s political office) and coordinate our patrol schedule with the Mahdi Militia 
to ensure good coverage in the city.   
 The situation in southern Iraq is not much different; the head of the Badr Corps in 
Basra, Ghanim Mayahi, said his organization was only providing “support and 
assistance” to the police through lightly armed militiamen. “There is no law, there is no 
order, and the police are scared of the tribes.  Badr is not afraid, and it can face those 
threats.”83  Because of this security reinforcement, areas where the militias have 
consolidated control are on the whole much safer than areas still contested by Sunnis and 
Shi`as.  My unit’s stay in Sadr City only witnessed one successful suicide bomb attack 
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carried out within the city itself, despite their frequent occurrence in other parts of eastern 
Baghdad.  Granted, the intense sectarian violence that has taken place since then has 
changed the situation, as Sunni groups such as al-Jaysh al-Islami, Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna 
and Tandhim al-Qaeda consider Sadr City a priority target because of the Mahdi Militia’s 
involvement in the sectarian violence.84  This targeting produced an increase in 
successful suicide bombings within Sadr City’s limits, but only strengthens the Mahdi 
Militia’s claims to provide security. 
 The car bomb attacks on 23 November 2006 in Sadr City, which killed an 
estimated 200 people, demonstrate this point.  After the explosions, militiamen provided 
disaster relief, directing medical evacuations, crowd control, and even catching other car 
bombers before they entered the city.  Sadr City residents regard the Mahdi Militia as 
heroes; Shihab Ahmed, a 24 year-old salesmen wounded in the attack, said that “the 
Mahdi Army are the people who helped us after the explosion…They saved us.”85  
Another resident, Salim Faisal Abid, voiced the opinions of many by expressing his 
support for the continued presence of the Mahdi Militia by noting that “[i]t has proved 
there is no need to disarm the Mahdi Army…If they were not there yesterday, it would 
have been a disaster.”86  The Mahdi Militia clearly receives their support from the 
populace they serve; a militia member struck to the heart of the issue after the 23 
November bombings when he said that “we [The Mahdi Militia] do even more than what 
the government should do.”87  A Sadr City resident later supported this line of thought 
during the American and Iraqi security operations into the Shi`a enclave, saying that the 
Mahdi Militia was “treating us very well…What are the Americans doing here?”88 
 As a result of the recent sectarian violence, not only do the Shi`a militias receive 
more overt support from the population, but citizens are flocking to join their ranks 
because they support the militia’s mission as protectors and providers of humanitarian 
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aid.   Salam Saedi, who normally works at a hotel in downtown Baghdad, signed up for 
the Mahdi Militia following the 23 November Sadr City bombings, stating that he was 
neutral to the Mahdi Militia before, “but after the attacks I saw the people who were 
killed and my feelings changed…So I contacted some friends and I went and I signed up 
with the Mahdi army.  They gave me an AK-47.”89  The cycle of violence is only making 
the militias, particularly the Mahdi Militia, more powerful.   
 Indeed, during the security crackdown across Baghdad Muqtada al-Sadr 
instructed his militiamen to lie low, not carry weapons around in their areas, and 
generally avoid causing trouble or getting caught.  Laith Abu Bakr, a Mahdi Militiamen 
in Sadr City, remarked on the Iraqi Army and American security efforts in Sadr City, 
saying “[w]e feel upset, but what can we do?...We have orders not to act.”90  During the 
security operation, Sunni extremists conducted numerous bombing attacks on Shi`a 
markets and Shi`a pilgrims on their way to Karbala, resulting in large numbers of Shi`a 
casualties.  Whether the attacks could have been prevented if the Mahdi Militia had been 
conducting vigilant security is debatable; one Shi`a in Baghdad summed up the feelings 
of many, saying “[d]espite the heavy security presence in Baghdad, we are seeing the 
terror and bombings escalate and more innocents being killed…When the Al Mahdi army 
was providing protection, there were no violations.”91 
 Sunni communities are also organizing forces at the grassroots level to provide 
protection for their neighborhoods.  Although not nearly as organized as the Shi`a 
militias, and probably with less overarching goals, the Sunnis are rapidly forming 
neighborhood watch-like organizations.  In Dora, a mostly Sunni Baghdad neighborhood, 
a local named Juburi states that after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, a group of 
retired Baathist officers formed a group to conduct security patrols in the neighborhood, 
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which now consists of a total between 2000 and 2500 men.92  Juburi claims that at any 
given time, “there are anywhere between 400 and 500 organized fighters in my area 
doing patrols and setting up checkpoints for defensive measures in the event that we are 
attacked by militias.”93  As Juburi’s comments demonstrate, the Sunni ‘militias’ are 
currently smaller units organized primarily for neighborhood protection; what other goals 
they have, if any, are currently unknown.   
 Essentially, until the government can provide effective security for Shi`a and 
Sunni communities, the militias will continue to garner a great deal of support from their 
constituents, making the government’s attempts to disband the militias virtually 
impossible because they provide the most essential service in Iraq today: security.  
Because the people look to militias to fill this need instead of the corrupt police forces or 
the fledgling army, the central government is further delegitimized.  
F. CONCLUSION ON MILITIAS  
 In conclusion, even as militias greatly contribute to the problems that confront the 
Iraqi government; they are more importantly a symptom of a larger problem.  As Vali 
Nasr concluded: 
Just as the Iraqi Shiites’ rise to power has brought hope to Shiites 
throughout the Middle East, so has it bred anxiety among the region's 
Sunnis.  De-Baathification, which removed significant obstacles to the 
Shiites' assumption of power in Iraq, is maligned as an important cause of 
the ongoing Sunni insurgency … Stemming adversarial sectarian politics 
will require satisfying Shiite demands while  placating Sunni anger and 
alleviating Sunni anxiety, in Iraq and throughout the region.94 
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There is little doubt that the fall of Saddam Hussein and the events that followed 
strengthened the Shi`a’s power and influence throughout the Middle East.  Recent 
unclassified reports indicate that Iran, which already has a great deal of influence in Iraq 
through its providing arms and training to the Shi`a militias, is now helping the Mahdi 
Militia build a relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon.  A senior U.S. intelligence 
official, who spoke under the condition of anonymity to the New York Times, elaborates: 
They [Iran] have been a link to Lebanese Hezbollah and have helped 
facilitate Hezbollah training inside of Iraq, but more importantly Jaish al-
Mahdi [Mahdi Militia] members going to Lebanon … There seems to 
have been a strategic decision taken sometime over late winter or early 
spring by Damascus, Tehran, along with their partners in Lebanese 
Hezbollah, to provide more support to Sadr  to increase pressure on the 
U.S.95 
What kind of long term threat this increased link between Iran, Hezbollah, and the Mahdi 
Militia remains to be seen, but it will likely have two major consequences.  First, a united 
central Iraqi government that represents all communities in Iraq will be elusive, as 
disenfranchised Sunnis will continue to be reluctant to join a Shi`a dominated central 
government which they perceive as friendly to Iran.  Second, the U.S. military position in 
Iraq, particularly in the Shi`a held populous areas, will become increasingly tenuous 
should the Mahdi Militia increase its overt attacks on coalition forces, as these attacks 
will likely increase in lethality due to the influx of technology from Iran.  Both of these 
possible outcomes are obviously detrimental to U.S. interests in the region over the long-
term.    
 At the current time, however, the various militias’ overt and covert opposition to 
the United States and its partners puts the central government in a tedious political 
position.  On one hand, the central government still depends on the United States for 
political and military support because it lacks the power to confront the militias outright.  
On the other, the government recognizes that the militias are necessary to provide 
security for their supporters because neither the U.S. forces nor the ISF can sufficiently 
provide the security necessary to protect Iraqi citizens from sectarian attacks.  Because 
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militias provide this most basic and crucial good, security, they cannot be simply 
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IV. A GOVERNMENT AT LOGGERHEADS: SOCIETAL 
INFLUENCES WITHIN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT 
In addition to the ways that Iraq’s communities directly influence the security 
situation, societal loyalties within the Iraqi government also contribute to the 
government’s inability to consolidate control over the country.  The Iraqi government is 
set up so that Iraq’s different communities have a voice in the government, yet this very 
structure results in differences of opinion and therefore slow decision-making, the result 
being an ineffective counter-insurgency campaign.  This section of the thesis examines 
how societal differences within the Iraqi central government affect its ability to 
consolidate control over the country. 
 On 15 December 2005, Iraq held an election to select its new permanent 
government.  The election witnessed millions of Iraqis flocking to the polls to vote for 
their favorite candidates; Iraqis generally voted along sectarian lines, Sunnis voting for 
Sunni tickets, Shi`a voting for Shi`a, and the Kurds voting for their political parties.  The 
outcome of the election was therefore unsurprising in that the Shi`a won a majority in the 
new government.  However, the Iraqi Constitution states that the parliament must elect a 
prime minister with a 2/3 majority, which the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) lacked, 
resulting in the ouster of Interim Prime Minister Jafari and the selection of Nuri al-
Maliki, a Shi`a on the UIA ticket.96  The UIA is a Shi`a political alliance that shares 
power between SIIC and the Da`wa Party, along with a few additional, smaller Shi`a 
political groups.97  The parliament selected Talabani to remain as the president, and 
chose as deputy presidents Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a Shi`a, and Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni.  
Maliki chose as deputy prime ministers one Sunni, Salam al-Zubaie, and one Kurd, 
Barham Salih.  Maliki appointed 37 cabinet ministers, composed of eight Sunnis, seven 
Kurds, 21 Shi`as, and one Christian, with Gen. Abdul Qadir Mohammad Jasim al-Mifarji, 
a Sunni, heading the Ministry of Defense, Jawad al-Bulani, a Shi`a, as the Minister of 
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Interior, and Sherwan al-Waili, a Shi`a, as the Minister of National Security.98  With this 
diverse team of cabinet ministers, particularly the two most important, Defense and 
Interior, Maliki’s central government began their quest to consolidate control over and 
govern the country.   
A. SADR FLEXES HIS POLITICAL MUSCLES  
 Roughly six months after Iraq formed its new central government, the Department 
of Defense gave its quarterly report to Congress on progress in Iraq.  When discussing 
political obstacles to progress, the DoD stated: 
Personal loyalties to various sub-national groups, such as tribe, sect, or 
political party, are often stronger than loyalty to Iraq as a nation-state.  In 
addition, Iraq’s political parties are often unwilling or unable to resolve 
conflicts through compromise.  Further, some Iraqis have joined the 
political process but condone or maintain support for violent means as a 
source of political leverage.  This makes effective national reconciliation 
and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs difficult to 
design and implement.99 
Numerous examples support the Department of Defense’s report, but perhaps one 
of the most glaring and standout examples of greater loyalty to a political party than the 
central government is the boycott of the central government the Sadrists conducted 
following Prime Minister Maliki’s meeting with President Bush in Amman, Jordan on 31 
November 2006.  Muqtada al-Sadr’s official followers in the Iraqi government, 
consisting of 30 parliament members and 6 cabinet ministers, followed through on their 
threats to boycott the central government if Maliki met with President Bush to discuss 
security issues.  Upon his return, Maliki asked the Sadrists to return to the government 
and settle their differences within the political framework, further remarking that he 
“wish[ed] they would reconsider their decision because it doesn’t represent a positive 
development in our political process.”100 
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 The Sadr bloc said they would return to the government only if President Bush 
gave more authority to Maliki regarding security decisions, in addition to improving 
public services.101  A spokesman for the Sadrists, Fallah Hassan Shensel, claimed that the 
group was reaching out across sectarian lines to mobilize an alliance against the 
American military presence in Iraq, saying that “it’s a patriotic national group, it’s not 
sectarian or ethnic…We need to be freed from the occupation.”102  Although the 
opposition to the American presence in Iraq is strong amongst both the Shi`as and the 
Sunnis, and the Sunnis had previously celebrated Sadr’s uprisings against the American 
forces in 2004, the Sadrists did not receive support for their boycott from the Sunnis.  
This is no doubt in part due to the sectarian attacks on the Sunnis by the Mahdi Militia’s 
“death squads,” which removed any semblance of unity between the two groups, despite 
their sometimes converging agendas.   
 The Sadr bloc returned to the government on 21 January 2007 in the face of a 
government security crackdown across Baghdad; an effort that Prime Minister Maliki 
pledged would target all forces hostile to the government, both Shi`a and Sunni.  Prime 
Minister Maliki had previously protected the Shi`a militias from U.S. military operations, 
often requiring his approval before any raids or searches.  Maliki reversed his position on 
the Mahdi Militia in light of overwhelming evidence that the group participated in 
sectarian killings; one Iraqi official speaking on the condition of anonymity remarked that 
“Al-Maliki realized he couldn't keep defending the Mahdi Army because of the 
information and evidence that the armed group was taking part in the killings, displacing 
people and violating the state’s sovereignty.”103   
 The Sadr bloc most likely hastened their return to government in part to try to 
prevent or mitigate the effects of such a crackdown, rather than a sudden sense of 
patriotism and national duty.  The boycott episode demonstrates where the loyalties of the 
Sadrists bloc lie—one can easily surmise that the Sadrists actually boycotted because 
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they knew that President Bush would pressure Prime Minister Maliki to act against the 
Shi`a militias at their security meeting in Jordan, particularly the Mahdi Militia, and they 
therefore sought to prevent the meeting from taking place.  The Sadr bloc, and by 
extension the Mahdi Militia, most likely sought to simply maintain their power and 
influence in Iraq and within the Iraqi government.  Such an agenda only weakens the 
political process and the Iraqi government, as it tries to hold the government’s security 
decisions hostage to their wishes, hindering the government’s ability to consolidate 
control over the country. 
 Another mark against the Sadr bloc in government is their complete 
mismanagement of the ministries that they run.  This mismanagement only serves to 
make the government more illegitimate in the eyes of the Iraqi people, making them less 
likely to support the government on other, more important measures such as security, 
making the government’s efforts to consolidate control over the country more difficult.  
One of the best examples of the Sadr bloc’s incompetence is the Ministry of Health’s 
deterioration since it has been under their management.   
 Iraq once had one of the better health care systems in the Middle East, but 
unfortunately the Gulf War and subsequent sanctions damaged the system’s efficiency.  
Unfortunately, things have only gotten worse since the ministry has been under the Sadr 
bloc’s control.  A former U.N. official judged Iraq’s health care system as “looking more 
and more like a country in sub-Saharan Africa.”104  A CBS News investigation revealed 
that Sunni patients were sometimes dragged from their beds and murdered, and 
ambulances used to transport weapons and hostages of the Sadr bloc’s military arm, the 
Mahdi Militia.105  Doctors and officials in Baqubah, a Sunni-dominated area north of 
Baghdad, claim that the Sadr-run ministry discriminates against them by refusing to give 
them necessary supplies.  Tariq Hiali, a health official in Baqubah, said that “[w]e have 
no medications or blood serum supplies … The Ministry of Health is not providing us 
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with medications and medical equipment; they consider [us] terrorists.”106  Another 
Baqubah official, this one a blood bank employee, said that the “ambulances we send to 
Baghdad are being intercepted by the Mahdi army,” who in turn sell the bags of blood on 
the market for up to $100 a bag.107  A U.S. Army civil affairs soldier stationed in Tikrit 
reported that 57 truckloads of medicine disappeared in the last week of October and first 
week of November 2006.108 
 In an apparent recognition of the Health Ministry’s corruption, Iraqi and U.S. 
forces arrested the Sadr bloc Deputy Health Minister Hakim al-Zamili on 8 February 
2007 on charges of filling the Ministry of Health with Mahdi Militiamen, embezzlement, 
and using “facilities and services for sectarian kidnapping and murder.”109  Zamili is the 
first high-level cabinet official arrested for fueling sectarian violence, although Sadr bloc 
parliament member Bahar al-Araji decried the arrest, saying “[t]his is not an attack on the 
Sadr organization … It’s an attack on the Iraqi government.”110  This statement makes 
clear that some members of the government do not support its efforts to stem the societal 
strife afflicting the country, despite evidence put forth by the Ministry of Interior and 
U.S. authorities that implicated Zamili in trafficking arms and militants, in addition to 
numerous murders.    
 It is obvious from these reports that the Sadr-led Ministry of Health has poor 
accountability over its operations and personnel, but more significantly lets its Shi`a 
societal loyalties prevail over the health needs of the entire country.  These actions only 
deepen Sunni discontent and mistrust of the government, and possibly fuel the Sunni 
backlash against the government and the dominant Shi`a even more, thereby making a 
political settlement more difficult.  The Sadr bloc’s loyalty to their constituent society 
rather than the central government, evidenced by their boycott of government and 
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corruption in the ministries they manage, hinders the government’s attempt to consolidate 
control over the country because it feeds the societal strife tearing apart Iraq. 
B. SUNNI DISCONTENT WITH SHI`A LEADERSHIP 
There are numerous other examples of divisive currents in Iraq’s central 
government.  One of the many policy disagreements along sectarian lines amongst Iraq’s 
“executive branch” of government erupted over the checkpoints the U.S. Army erected 
around Sadr City after the kidnapping of an American soldier; the U.S. suspects the 
Mahdi Militia of involvement in the kidnapping.  Prime Minister Maliki ordered the 
checkpoints lifted after weeks of wrangling with the United States government over the 
issue, and finally got his way at the end of October 2006.  Shi’a members of the Iraqi 
government, such as the deputy speaker of the Parliament Khaled al-Attiya, praised the 
move, stating that “All the militias will disband at the end of the day but these are not the 
main enemy of the Iraqi people…The main enemy are the Baathists and Saddamists who 
want to destroy the political process and the main principles of the constitution.”111  The 
Sunni members of the Iraqi government did not all agree with Maliki’s decision, 
including Deputy President Tariq al-Hashimi, who stated that “I'm afraid that by lifting 
the siege the government sent the wrong message to those who stand behind terrorism in 
Iraq.  It says the iron fist will loosen and they can move freely.”112  Hashimi clearly 
viewed the targets of the siege quite differently than did Attiya, referring to the Mahdi 
Militia as “those who stand behind terrorism,” while Attiya claimed the militias were not 
the main enemy of Iraq.  These differences of opinion on who the true enemies of Iraq are 
make it difficult for the central government to agree on legitimate targets to pursue in 
their campaign to stop the violence. 
More distrust and divisions within the government boiled to the surface on 25 
January 2006 when Prime Minister Maliki briefed the new “surge” security plan for 
Baghdad to members of Parliament during a nationally broadcast session, promising that 
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there would be no “safe haven” for militants and insurgents after the crackdown’s 
implementation, also claiming that the government would immediately “start arresting 
anybody who took by force the house of a displaced family.”113  At this, Abdul Nasir al-
Janabi, a powerful Sunni leader in the Parliament, asked that the government stop “the 
firing of officers and civil servants under the pretext of de-Ba'athification … What kind 
of national reconciliation are you talking about when you are implementing rules that 
marginalize [Sunnis] … Stop sentencing innocent people to death because such sentences 
are politically motivated.”114  Janabi added that the Parliament should have oversight of 
the security operation in Baghdad, retorting that “[w]e cannot trust the office of the prime 
minister.”115  This last remark threw Maliki into a fit of rage, accusing Janabi himself of 
being a militant, stating that “[t]his brother [Janabi] will trust the Cabinet when I come 
forward with your file and show that you are responsible.  There are 150 people detained 
in [the] Buhayrat area, and you don't speak about them,”116 implying that the government 
had evidence of Janabi’s guilt in these kidnappings in the Buhayrat area, where Janabi’s 
supporters are.  These remarks caused Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, the Sunni speaker of the 
Parliament, to pound his gavel and restore order, stating “[t]hat is unacceptable, Mr. 
Prime Minister… It is unacceptable, Mr. Prime Minister, to make such accusations 
against a lawmaker under the dome of Parliament.”117 
The bickering continued after the cameras were turned off, with Mr. Mashhadani 
demanding that Maliki apologize to Janabi for his remarks; members of the UIA 
(Maliki’s party) responded that it was Janabi who should apologize, not Maliki; 
Mashhadani then threatened to quit.118  These disagreements unfortunately do not give 
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Iraqi citizens much faith in their government; a Sadr City resident ruefully commented on 
the state of politics in Iraq, saying that “Sunni and Shiite politicians pretend to work for 
reconciliation, but they curse each other when the news cameras are gone.”119  Even 
though the Parliament eventually returned to business and approved the government’s 
security plan, this episode highlights the mistrust and societal loyalties at work in the 
central government.  There are notable tensions amongst the Parliament and between the 
Parliament and the Prime Minister along societal lines, making the government’s 
attempts to consolidate control over the country more difficult than they already are. 
Another event that highlighted the sectarian divisions within the Iraqi government 
and heightened Sunni mistrust of it is the alleged rape of a Sunni woman by Iraqi Police 
in Baghdad on 19 February 2007.  Almost immediately after the woman appeared on Al 
Jazeera with her account of being kidnapped and sexually assaulted at the hands of three 
Iraqi National Police, Shi`a politicians dismissed the allegations as propaganda meant to 
undermine the new security efforts.120  Prime Minister Maliki initially promised a full 
investigation of the incident, but reversed his position hours later, saying that “[i]t has 
been shown after medical examinations that the woman had not been subjected to any 
sexual attack whatsoever, and that there are three outstanding arrest warrants against her 
issued by security agencies.”121 
Sunni politicians supported the woman, and demanded that a thorough 
investigation be conducted.  A spokesman for a Sunni bloc of politicians demanded that 
the case “should not be dealt with on a sectarian basis,” and then went on to say that if the 
government did not handle the rape allegations well, it could undermine its authority in 
security operations.122  Other Sunni politicians spoke out much more vehemently, 
including Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, the Sunni speaker of the Parliament, who said that if 
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the government didn’t “bring justice to this Muslim Iraqi woman, whom you should view 
as your sister or daughter … history will curse us with eternal disgrace.”123   
Other Sunni leaders also linked the rape allegations and the government’s 
response to the government’s efforts to secure Baghdad.  Sheik Abdel Nasser Janabi, who 
belongs to a mostly Sunni bloc in the parliament, claimed that the rape highlighted “the 
fact that there are dirty hands within the security plan.”124  Janabi and other Sunni 
politicians also condemned the Baghdad security plan as a scheme to allow militias to go 
into hiding while security forces went into Sunni areas, and threatened that Sunni parties 
might withdraw from the government if their concerns were not addressed.125  The head 
of the Sunni Endowment, Ahmed Abdel Ghafour Samaraie, called for an international 
investigation to occur because he did not trust the government’s ability to handle the 
situation, and further claimed that the rape incident proved that the government had not 
yet purged thugs from the Iraqi Security Forces, saying that he thought “the Baghdad 
security plan in the beginning was good, but the negative aspect is that the militias are 
penetrating these forces.”126  Prime Minister Maliki later fired Samaraie from his post, 
although his legality to do so is unclear.  Other Sunnis called for more drastic measures; 
the Islamic Army in Iraq, a Sunni insurgent group, warned its members to prepare for 
revenge, declaring that they would “intensify attacks against the Iraqi security forces” to 
get even.127 
This unfortunate incident, whether the allegations are true or not, highlights three 
things.  First, that many politicians in Iraq’s central government rush to judgment on 
issues along societal lines without first discerning all of the facts.  Second, Sunnis in Iraq 
associate government responses to incidents against their society to the government’s 
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legitimacy.  If the government does not stand up for or represent the Sunnis well in a 
particular incident, they see the government as illegitimate and corrupt.  Lastly, some 
Sunnis, such as the Islamic Army in Iraq, view violence as a justifiable recourse against a 
government they see as corrupt and illegitimate.  The Sunni discontent with the Shi`a 
leadership in the government greatly hinders the government’s ability to consolidate 
control over the country. 
C. SADDAM’S EXECUTION 
Another indicator of the sectarianism in the Iraqi government is the manner in 
which the government conducted Saddam Hussein’s execution.  An Iraqi court rightly 
convicted him for his murderous response to a Shi`a assassination attempt (by Maliki’s 
Dawa party no less) and gave him the death penalty, but the way the government carried 
it out on 30 December 2006 only furthered the Sunni view that the central government is 
dominated by Shi`as bent on revenge, rather than an objective, fair, and representative 
government that holds the long-term interests of Iraq at stake.  The Iraqi government 
executed Saddam Hussein on what Sunnis celebrate as the first day of the sacred Muslim 
holiday Eid al-Adha; the Shi`a observe the start of the holiday one day later.  Normally, 
in order for the government to carry out an execution the Iraqi president and two vice-
presidents must sign the execution order, an act to prevent executions being conducted 
along sectarian lines.128  However, for crimes against humanity this process is not 
necessary, and did not occur in Saddam Hussein’s case; however, had this process been 
followed it may have decreased the sectarian outcry that followed the execution.  The 
government could have easily waited to deliver justice until after the holiday was over for 
all Muslims.   
Unfortunately for the Iraqi government, this was not the worst of it.  One of the 
witnesses to the hanging recorded the proceedings on his cell phone, allowing the entire 
world to see the spectacle.  Saddam Hussein presented himself as the most dignified 
figure in the execution chamber, while some present taunted him with chants of 
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“Muqtada, Muqtada, Muqtada.”129  The Washington Post editorial by Charles 
Krauthammer represented the views of many, saying that the “world saw Hussein falling 
through the trapdoor, executed not in the name of a new and democratic Iraq but in the 
name of Muqtada al-Sadr …”130  The Economist stated that the hanging “reinforced the 
Sunni sense of injury at the hands of what many see as a puppet sectarian regime.”131  
President Bush even joined in the execution criticism, stating that the hanging looked like 
“kind of a revenge killing,” adding that “I was disappointed and felt like they fumbled the 
— particularly the Saddam Hussein — execution.”132  President Bush also acknowledged 
that the hanging would make it more difficult “to make the case to the American people 
that this is a government that does want to unify the country.”133  Although Saddam 
Hussein certainly deserved the punishment he received, the manner in which the Iraqi 
government carried out the sentence—by rushing the execution so that it fell on the first 
day of Sunni’s observation of Eid al-Adha, and the antics it allowed in the execution 
room—only made the execution appear as victor’s justice, rather than justice delivered by 
a democratic state.  The execution exposed the presence of communal influences in the 
Iraqi government, and this unfortunately pours salt on the country’s wounds, making it 
even more difficult for the central government to consolidate control over its country.   
D. COUNTERPOINT: THE GOVERNMENT IS MAKING INROADS 
DESPITE DIFFERENCES 
Despite the grim picture of the Iraqi government painted thus far, there are some 
indications of progress with respect to the security situation within the Iraqi government.  
In particular, there are two fairly significant indicators of the Iraqi government’s 
willingness to work through its societal differences: first, the Iraqi cabinet approved a 
draft oil law that equitably distributes oil revenues amongst Iraq’s citizens; second, Prime 
Minister Maliki acknowledged the societal nature and corruption of some ministries 
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within his cabinet, including all ministers belonging to the Sadr bloc, and promised to 
replace them with qualified leaders (which he subsequently did with Muqtada al-Sadr’s 
support).134 
On 27 February 2007, Iraq’s Cabinet finally agreed on a new oil law (which still 
needs to be approved by the Parliament) that would require the Shi`a and Kurds to share 
revenues from Iraq’s oil exports with the minority Sunnis, whose area of the country 
contains no proven oil reserves.135  The law would distribute oil revenues to all eighteen 
provinces based on population size and allow regional administrations to negotiate oil 
contracts with foreign companies (which must then be approved by the central 
government).136  The willingness of the Kurds and the Shi`a to share the potential wealth 
of oil pumped from their areas of the country with the Sunnis, under whom they were 
oppressed for many years, is a crucial step that could possibly enfranchise Sunnis and 
undercut the anti-government currents in the Sunni community, making it easier for the 
government to consolidate control over the country.  Although the draft law is more than 
two months late, it is a necessary step if Iraq is to remain one country; it is difficult to 
place blame on the Iraqi government for their delinquency—after all, how many 
democratic governments produce landmark legislation on time? 
The other significant development in Iraq’s government that may help it to 
somewhat overcome its sectarian image is Maliki’s recent decision to investigate and if 
necessary prosecute some of his cabinet ministers whom have proven to be corrupt or 
downright criminal and also his decision to fire or reassign members of the security 
forces with militia ties.  On 3 March 2007, Maliki announced that he would conduct a 
formal investigation (similar to a grand jury investigation) of some cabinet members 
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suspected of corruption or of having ties to extremists, saying that authorities are still 
determining “who should be arrested and the reasons behind arresting them.”137 
Another important development is the ongoing purge in the Ministry of Interior of 
policemen suspected of having ties with militias or suspected of other wrongdoings, such 
as torture.  The ministry’s deputy spokesman, Jassim Hassoon, recently claimed that over 
10,000 personnel had been reassigned or fired, further stating that “[m]aybe we aren't 
100% cured, but we're getting better day by day.”138  This is an important process—
which needs to continue—that in the long term could help restore some legitimacy to the 
interior ministry, which is deeply mistrusted by many Sunnis because it is widely 
regarded as infiltrated by Shi`a militias.  A capable and impartial police force is vital in 
the long run if Iraq is to be a stable country.  Both of these steps by Maliki’s government, 
investigating cabinet members and shaking up the Ministry of Interior, are important 
strides to make if the government is to become legitimate; even though the Iraqi 
government should have undertaken them months ago, it is better late than never. 
E. CONCLUSIONS ON THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
The CATO institute recently issued a very pessimistic outlook on the odds that 
the U.S. will be able to recognize its strategic goal of establishing a stable, secure Iraq 
with a representative government.  While analyzing the Iraqi government, the study 
dismissed the notion that a political reconciliation could occur in Iraq, claiming that: 
Calling for a true government of national unity may be noble in principle, 
but operationally it is an oxymoron.  Iraq leaders … have their own 
agendas, and creating a united country with an equitable distribution of 
power … is not a high priority.  The reality is that if Iraqi leaders were 
both capable of forging such a system and inclined to do so, they would 
already have taken major steps toward that goal.  That they have not done 
so explains why the … goal of political reconciliation will not be 
attained.139 
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The former National Security Agency Director, LTG William Odom, backed up this 
assertion, saying that “no ‘deal’ of any kind can be made among the warring parties in 
Iraq that will bring stability even temporarily.”140  General David Petreus also 
characterized Iraqi politics in these terms a few months after he began his turnaround 
efforts there, saying the Iraqi government was “not a government of national unity. 
Rather, it is one comprised of political leaders from different parties that often default to 
narrow agendas and a zero-sum approach to legislation.”141   
Other senior American commanders have also noted the sectarian and corrupt 
nature of the Iraqi government.  Major General Benjamin Mixon, the senior commander 
in northern Iraq, said that the government in the Diyala province was “ineffective,” and 
that all provincial governments in northern Iraq were hampered by poor support from the 
central government in Baghdad, which was “overburdened by a centralized bureaucratic 
process…and impacted by corruption and sectarian issues.”142  Major General Mixon 
went on to link the government’s ineffectiveness with the security situation, saying that 
the “most important and difficult task we have is to improve the Iraqi government 
capacity…That will lead the people to having confidence in their government.  The 
confidence of the people in that government will enhance our security operations and 
enable us to ultimately defeat this enemy.”143  
These viewpoints are just a few of the many that believe that the political 
divisions along societal lines in Iraq are too great to overcome because Iraq’s politicians 
currently view politics as zero-sum through a religious lens.  As long as this is the case, 
and there is no indication of change anytime in the foreseeable future, the result will be 
an ineffective, indecisive government that is not seen as legitimate by all of Iraq’s people, 
which therefore contributes to the cycle of violence gripping Iraq.  
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Prime Minister Maliki himself declared on 26 November 2006 after a few 
particularly bloody and violent weeks acknowledged that the violence in Iraq was mostly 
political in nature, and called upon politicians to set aside their differences and begin 
working together: 
These actions are at most the reflection of political backgrounds and wills 
and sometimes the reflection of dogmatic, perverted backgrounds and 
wills … The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of 
aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians.144 
Whether Prime Minister Maliki himself can rise above sectarian politics and truly lead 
the government to unity remains to be seen.  Although the Iraqi government has shown 
small signs of progress lately, it has been in place for over a year and has demonstrated a 
limited willingness to work together to overcome sectarian differences and act decisively 
to confront the violence, as demonstrated by the Saddam hanging and his handling of the 
rape allegations, among many other things.   
This does not bode well for political reconciliation anytime soon, which will only 
lead to more communal violence in Iraq because the Sunnis do not see the government as 
legitimate, and the Shi`a see the Sunni extremists and their more moderate supporters as 
the main hindrance to achieving stability in Iraq.  Indeed, on 30 April 2007 the largest 
Sunni bloc in Parliament, the Iraqi Consensus Front, threatened to withdraw its ministers 
from Prime Minister Maliki’s cabinet because they had “lost hope in rectifying the 
situation despite all of its sincere and serious efforts to do so.”145  At this writing, six 
cabinet ministers from the Sunni political party Iraqi Consensus Front and five ministers 
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its sectarian nature.  The Sadr bloc cabinet members have been absent since April, when 
they left the government because the Prime Minister refused to set a date for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops.146 
Some would argue that the current Iraqi government might never effectively 
govern Iraq due to the current security and political climate in the country.  If this is the 
case, then perhaps the only government that could consolidate control over most of the 
country, except perhaps the Anbar Province, is one composed entirely of Shi`a.  Although 
this would be entirely unpalatable to the current United States Administration, probably 
cause Sunnis who live in mixed neighborhoods to migrate to Sunni areas or to brave a 
Shi`a government that could possibly carry out extreme repression of the Sunnis, and 
would most likely result in continued Sunni violence against Shi`a areas and the Shi`a 
government, a government of this nature could actually be more stable in the long term 
because it would not be beset with as many conflicts of interests, although its 
consolidation period in the short term would probably be bloody and painful. 
Other political scientists believe that a diverse Iraqi government can consolidate 
control over the country, but not until the various factions are ready to politically 
reconcile their differences.  James Fearson of Stanford University recently wrote in 
Foreign Affairs that further civil conflict 
may be the only way to reach a point where power sharing could become a 
feasible solution to the problem of governing Iraq. More fighting holds the 
prospect of clarifying the balance of forces and creating pressures for 
internal consolidation on one or both sides, thereby providing stronger 
grounds for either a victory by one side or a stable negotiated 
settlement.147 
This point of view is quite valid given the divergent viewpoints in Iraq—between and 
even within the different communities--although further fighting of the sort Fearson 
speaks of would be devastating for Iraq’s citizens, it may be unpreventable at this point. 
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There are various factions within the Shi`a, but even more so amongst the Sunni, some of 
whom completely reject the current government, and some grudgingly accept it as the 
best option they have.  Further, and perhaps most important for political reconciliation to 
work, no single Sunni or Shi`a can speak for the entire group, which makes adherence to 
an agreement nearly impossible.   
 This violence in Iraq is also nihilistic due to the downward spiral of revenge and 
tit for tat killings.  Bringing a halt to this violence in the short term will not be easy for an 
Iraqi government crippled with societal loyalties, and in order for the government to be 
viable and stable in the long term, it must be perceived as legitimate by all Iraqis.  This 
issue is one which causes many Iraqis, mostly Sunni, to carry out violence against the 
government.  Lieutenant Colonel Gian Gentile, who spent a year in the mostly Sunni 
Amiriyah neighborhood of Baghdad as a U.S. Army battalion commander, recognized 
that Sunnis had justifiable concerns about the new Shi`a government, stating: 
Sunnis killed and continue to kill Shiites and government forces because 
of sectarian hatred, to retaliate for what they view as unfair acts by the 
Shiite government and because they fear that any Shiites remaining in 
their district would provoke more oppressive government actions against 
them … When I spoke to shopkeepers, professionals, imams and others in 
Amiriyah, I was told that the solution to ending the violence—both  
insurgent attacks and sectarian killings—was an Iraqi government they 
saw as legitimate.148 
LTC Gentile’s experiences reinforce two hypotheses: 1) that people with real grievances 
against a government they perceive as illegitimate will resort to violence as a means to 
bring about change, and 2) that during periods of stress and uncertainty people fall back 
upon and look to their cultural identities for security.  Unfortunately, this reversion in 
Iraq has in part led to the societal violence and governmental disagreements between the 
Sunni and Shi`a, which hinders the current government’s ability to consolidate control 
over the country. 
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V. THESIS CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions section of this thesis will necessarily summarize the arguments 
made in the preceding chapters regarding how the three factors studied here, at three 
different levels of analysis, individual loyalty to community, the militias that formed as a 
result of this, and communal loyalties within the central government, all converge to 
affect the Iraqi government’s ability to consolidate control over their territory.  Following 
conclusions on the ideas already put forth in the thesis, this section will examine how 
these conclusions impact the United States’ efforts at reconciliation and stability in Iraq, 
with some thoughts on the current “surge” strategy and its effects on the militias and Iraqi 
politics, an alternative strategy the U.S. could pursue, and lastly views on U.S. grand 
strategy regarding democratization as a means of combating terrorism. 
In sum, three main factors all contribute to the Iraqi central government’s inability 
to consolidate control of their territory.  First, Iraq’s citizens for the time being are much 
more loyal to their community than to the central government in Baghdad because the 
communities filled the gap in government services after the coalition toppled Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in 2003, and have maintained that loyalty ever since because the 
government still cannot provide services, while various societal organization, such as the 
Sadr Bureau, continue to do so.  These communal loyalties also contributed to the zero-
sum thinking of societal leaders, as Rothchild discusses in his work on ethnic conflict in 
Africa, which has also come to fruition in Iraq, resulting in the struggle for power and the 
timeless question: who has the right to rule?  Unfortunately, the downward cycle of 
societal violence that I witnessed in Baghdad in 2005 but spiked to epic proportions after 
the Golden Mosque bombing in February 2006 hardened people’s loyalty to their 
respective communities because they both further identified with their community and 
depended on it for protection, which the central government can still not provide.  LTC 
Jeff Peterson, a battalion commander in Baghdad, opined that reconciliation of communal 
differences in the short term was highly unlikely due to the entrenched beliefs, mistrust, 
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and hatred, and that overcoming this is probably a “generational undertaking,”149 a view 
that U.S. leaders may not find welcome.  These communal loyalties underpin the two 
other factors which contribute to the Iraqi central government’s inability to consolidate 
control over its country. 
The second major factor confronting Iraq’s central government is the numerous 
militias that initially sprang up to provide security for their societal constituents in the 
power vacuum after Saddam Hussein’s demise, and which today, by their continued 
presence and prominence, control large amounts of territory and are the de facto power in 
the regions they inhabit.  As discussed above, these militias hinder the central 
government’s ability to consolidate control because they help propagate the communal 
violence currently underway by conducting attacks and threatening members of the 
opposite society.  Additionally, Shi`a militias, particularly the Badr Corps and the Mahdi 
Militia, have infiltrated the police forces, and, to a lesser extent, the national army.  This 
factor is significant because it further disenfranchises the Sunnis, who see these 
institutions as a tool of the Shi`a militias, which causes Sunnis to not only see the 
government as illegitimate, but to actively resist the government through the use of 
violence.  However, both Sunni and Shi`a militias continue to enjoy their constituent’s 
support because of the protection they provide from the sectarian violence; therefore, the 
notion that the militias can simply be disbanded and sent home is simply absurd unless 
the Iraqi central government and the coalition can provide effective security for all of 
Iraq, not just Baghdad, which is not likely to occur for numerous reasons outside the 
scope of this study. 
Lastly, the Iraqi government itself is a stumbling block for its ability to 
consolidate control over its territory.  The Iraqi government’s make-up of Iraq’s various 
communities, whom often play a zero-sum game for power and influence, has adverse 
affects on its performance.  Specifically, many actions the ruling majority Shi`a take 
cause the Sunnis to see the government as vengeful, such as the Shi`a governments 
decision to hang Saddam Hussein on the first day that Sunnis observe the Muslim holiday 
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Eid al-Adha, among others.  The government is also slow to make concessions and 
compromise amongst the communities that make it up.  In the face of a complex mix of 
an insurgency and societal civil war, the government’s rampant corruption, indecisive 
nature due to bickering along societal lines, and the perception many Sunnis have (right 
or wrong) that the government is a Shi`a instrument to consolidate power all greatly 
hinder the central government’s ability to consolidate control over its territory.  At the 
time of this writing, Prime Minister Maliki’s government is extremely weak, and it is 
possible that it will collapse entirely, perhaps to be replaced with a more effectual leader 
at its helm.   
For all of these reasons, Iraq’s central government has thus far been unable to 
consolidate control over the country; in Weberian terms, the Iraqi government does not 
have a monopoly of the use of force within its territory.  Therefore, Iraq cannot be 
considered a state strictly using Weber’s definition of the term.  Iraq rather falls into the 
category that Joel Migdal and others describe as having weak central governments 
because the state’s territory consists of diverse, strong, and often fragmented 
communities.  If one accepts Hannes Berts’ international law conclusions that “armed 
groups may assume the role of de facto government over territory under their effective 
control,” the Iraqi government’s problems may be multiplied.  Although this has already 
happened in many areas of Iraq, such as Sadr City, the government maintains its 
supremacy in part because of the U.S. presence in Iraq.  
Should the United States decide to withdraw some or all of its forces, it is likely 
that Shi`a militias and other armed groups may move into areas that are currently 
contested and consolidate control over them.150  If this phenomenon plays out all over 
Iraq along sectarian lines, the central government may have little choice but to adopt 
federalism as a means to hold the country together, particularly if Iraq’s communities try 
to gain international support from countries sympathetic to their respective plights.  
Whatever the future holds for Iraq, the ever-strengthening militias that currently operate 
within Iraq’s territory will undoubtedly play a role. 
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A. HYPOTHESES CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of this examination of society’s impact on the Iraqi government, 
three hypotheses were presented to keep in mind throughout the study.  First, the idea that 
anarchic conditions resulting after Saddam Hussein’s demise caused people to revert to 
their communal identities for support, comfort, and security.  The second hypothesis is 
essentially the inverse of the first: that the strong community-based identities and mutual 
hatred witnessed today in Iraq have always existed, but Saddam Hussein kept them 
repressed by his authoritarian rule, and that when his regime fell, the tensions came to the 
forefront, causing the anarchic conditions seen currently.  The last hypothesis put forth at 
the beginning of this study is more straightforward—that groups who believe they have 
legitimate and real grievances against a government they think unwilling or unable to 
address their issues turn to violence and rebellion against the government and its 
supporters to achieve redress.   
Even after this study, it is still rather difficult to point to any one of these 
hypotheses as the sole explanation of the current situation in Iraq because elements of all 
three hypotheses certainly exist in Iraq to varying degrees.  However, two of the 
hypotheses are the most applicable to Iraq: first, the idea that anarchic conditions increase 
societal loyalties and identity is certainly true in Iraq, and has been a theme touched on 
throughout this study.  Although Saddam Hussein certainly repressed certain ethnic 
groups, the number of inter-societal marriages, business contacts, and social contacts 
during Saddam Hussein’s regime points to very amicable relations amongst the 
communities in many parts of the country, and Baghdad in particular.  Following 
Saddam’s demise, during the chaos that ensued, people looked to their communities for 
support because communities were the only ones capable of providing many public 
goods.  Although a small number of people who harbored ancient societal hatreds may 
have played a part in fomenting the cycle of violence plaguing Iraq today, these ancient 
societal hatreds did not immediately cause the violence in Iraq. 
The other hypothesis that has large explanatory power in this study of Iraq’s 
communities and their impact on government is the last put forth, that groups of people 
will rebel and foment violence against a government they see as illegitimate because it 
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will not or is unable to redress their grievances.  This hypothesis has also been a 
somewhat common theme in this study, and it certainly applies to the Sunnis in Iraq, who 
see themselves as marginalized and largely cut out of power and influence in Iraq’s 
government, and therefore worry about the equitable future distribution of public goods 
and wealth by the government.  Although it would be great to be able to point to one 
explanation to explain Iraq’s problems, as with most things, Iraq’s issues are not that 
simple, and require multiple explanations.  The two most prevalent that apply to Iraq 
today are that communal identities increase greatly in anarchic and uncertain conditions, 
and that groups with legitimate grievances will rebel against a government that they 
believe will not give closure to their issues. 
B. A SURGE ANALYSIS: EFFECTS OF THE SURGE ON THE MILITIAS, 
IRAQI POLITICS, AND THE PROSPECTS THAT THE STRATEGY 
WILL SUCCEED 
On 10 January 2007, President Bush announced a new strategy of “surging” U.S. 
forces into Baghdad to try to reduce the amount of sectarian violence occurring in the 
capital.  In his speech to the nation, President Bush stated that the U.S. would send 
20,000 more troops (most of them to Baghdad) to Iraq in order to “help the Iraqis carry 
out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of 
Baghdad.”151   President Bush went on to discuss how the strategy would work and what 
it’s end-state was: 
Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and 
secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to 
help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the 
security that Baghdad  needs … When this happens, daily life will 
improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government 
will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical 
areas.152  
The remainder of this section will discuss the impact the surge has had on the militias in 
Baghdad and on politics in the capital, and lastly its prospects for success. 
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Following the beginning of the “surge” (this term is somewhat of a misnomer 
because it took until the middle of June for all of the forces to arrive) in February the 
militias in Baghdad for the most part reduced their visibility to avoid confrontations with 
U.S. forces, which resulted in a decrease in sectarian murders.  However, just because the 
militias have temporarily suspended their murdering campaign does not mean that their 
influence in the areas they control has in any way been diminished.  U.S. soldiers that 
deployed to the Ubaidi neighborhood in Eastern Baghdad to secure residents from the 
Mahdi Militia admit that they have been unable to meet their goals.  The Mahdi Militia 
threatened to kill the local Iraqi the Americans hired to clean the latrines before he even 
began work.  More significantly, the Mahdi Militia killed two women seen talking with 
the soldiers, obstructed their economic and infrastructure development efforts, and shut 
off the water supply.153  Even though the surge has forced the militias to significantly 
reduce their overt operations, it has not reduced their overall influence or changed their 
long-term goals.  One frustrated soldier currently working with the police forces in Sadr 
City noted that “I see a whole lot of money and a whole lot of American lives on the 
line…Two weeks after we leave, it's going to go back to the way it was,”154 which is 
precisely the same sentiment I felt during my time in Sadr City in 2005. 
1. The Sunni Perspective 
Another development of note is the increasing Sunni alliance with U.S. forces to 
combat al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in the Anbar and Diyala Provinces.  Although military 
leaders and the Bush administration tout this development as a great success in their 
surge strategy, it is in fact more likely an alliance of convenience—the former Sunni 
insurgents merely see al-Qaeda as the greatest short-term (rather than the U.S. military), 
which reminds one of the old adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”  One former 
insurgent who turned against AQI explained why he did so, noting that AQI “used  
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religion as a ploy to get in and exploit people’s passions…They started kicking people 
out of their houses and getting ransom from rich people.  They would shoot people in 
front of their houses to scare the others.”155   
However, just because some Sunni insurgents have recently allied with U.S. 
forces does not mean that they now support the current Iraqi government, as some in the 
U.S. administration would like to believe, and point to as a sign of progress in Iraq.  One 
Sunni insurgent leader associated with the Omar Brigades noted in July 2007 that the 
Shi`a political parties in the government were controlled by Iran, a country he loathed 
because of its history with Iraq and intolerance of Sunnis.  He further noted that the 
problem with the United States is that it has “a relationship with the slaves: Dawa, Badr 
Organization, the Mahdi Army are slaves to Iran.”156  The insurgent leader went on to 
note that when U.S. forces inevitably left Iraq, “[t]here will be a fierce civil war, a 
grinding civil war, because Iran will always be there…But the Sunnis are ready for such a 
day.”157 
One can conclude a few things from these developments: first, that although many 
Iraqi Sunnis do not support the current government, they are unwilling to standby while 
AQI continues to indiscriminately kill Iraqis of all communities, including other Sunnis.  
Second, that just because Sunni insurgents are willing to cooperate with coalition forces 
in the short-term does not mean they support the larger coalition policies or the Iraqi 
government.  On the contrary, some Sunni insurgent leaders such as the one noted above 
seem as determined as ever to force a political acquiescence from the ruling Shi`a, even if 
it takes a civil war.  Many Shi`a in the Iraqi government recognize this potential, which 
explains why they are hesitant to support the coalition forces’ efforts to arm the 
insurgents turned allies—these forces could become militias that confront the government 
in the future.  Sami Askari, an aide to Maliki, declared that by pursuing this strategy, the 
Americans had “solve[d] one problem by creating another.  This is a seed for civil 
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war.”158  Lastly, it is a possibility that some Sunni groups are only allying with the U.S. 
because they realize that the United States’ forces will not be in Iraq much longer, and 
therefore are endeavoring to garner as much military strength as possible for a possible 
confrontation with the Shi`a, or against rival Sunni tribes.  Thus, the fact that the U.S. 
administration trumpets this development as a huge success in their overall strategy is 
either short-sighted or dishonest. 
The most important overall conclusion that follows from the evidence available is 
that leaving Iraq precipitously will most likely not allow al-Qaeda to establish a base of 
operations there (despite the Bush administration’s frequent assertions to the contrary)—
most Sunnis in Iraq will likely prevent this from happening; if they don’t, then the Shi`a 
militias surely will.  In any case, an increase in the level of communal violence is sure to 
occur, likely as a result of the Shi`a militias that have mostly ridden out the “surge” so far 
and whose strength has not diminished, and the Sunni insurgent groups, some of which 
are gaining strength through their alliance with the U.S. 
2. Probability of Success with the “Surge” 
Paul F. Diehl analyzed the use of armed forces in limiting armed conflict (LAC) 
and bringing about conflict resolution (CR) in International Peacekeeping, in which 
Diehl studies various U.N. peacekeeping missions, and establishes criteria for success in 
both LAC and CR.  Diehl has many criteria he thinks helpful in order to limit armed 
conflict, but he only deems four as essential: consent of the actors, neutrality, geographic 
deployment, and interference of third parties.  When the Baghdad security plan is 
analyzed using Diehl’s criteria for the successful limitation of armed conflict, the plan 
does not have much going for it, although it is undoubtedly better than previous U.S. 
efforts to squash the violence.  First, the coalition forces do not have the consent of all the 
actors, whom are not necessarily ready to stop fighting.   
Second, and more importantly in this situation, the coalition forces are not 
perceived by all Iraqis as being neutral in the fight.  This criterion is not as applicable to 
U.S. forces, which will not stay in Iraq forever, but it is absolutely essential for the Iraqi 
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Forces to be seen as a neutral, legitimate entity of the state.  The Iraqi Forces do not meet 
this requirement because they have been heavily infiltrated by the Shi`a militias—the 
police more so than the army, but due to this and their societal persuasions all Iraqi 
citizens, and the Sunnis in particular, do not see the Iraqi Forces as a legitimate, neutral 
force. 
Third, the physical and social geography of Baghdad makes trying to limit armed 
conflict extremely difficult.  Baghdad’s urban terrain is not conducive to observing 
weapons trafficking or insurgent movements because the insurgents blend in with the 
population and it is nearly impossible to control all vehicular or foot traffic in the city.  
Additionally, the belligerents in the conflict live close to one another, often even in the 
same neighborhood.  As Diehl rightly points out, it is difficult to position troops between 
the antagonists in this type of situation.  On top of this, the U.S. plan is limited to 
Baghdad, and involves fewer troops to secure the rest of the country, which has resulted 
in much of the violence shifting from Baghdad to more outlying areas.  The factor that 
has crippled the U.S. strategy since the invasion in 2003 remains: there are not enough 
troops in Iraq to secure the entire country. 
Fourth, the Baghdad security plan is not occurring in a vacuum—Iraq’s 
neighbor’s, particularly Iran and Syria, are pursuing their own strategic aims in the 
region.  Administration officials frequently cite Iran for providing arms, training, and 
funding to Shi`a militias, such as the Mahdi Militia.  Syria is accused of providing or 
allowing their citizens to provide the same things to Sunni insurgent groups.  Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt also have little incentive to support the Shi`a government in Baghdad, 
as they see the Iraqi government as an extension of Iranian influence in the region, which 
they perceive to threaten their national security by upsetting the balance of power in the 
region, which Saddam Hussein had long stabilized.  This interference by Iraq’s neighbors  
in its internal problems not only makes it more difficult for the coalition troops to limit 
armed conflict in Baghdad, but makes a political solution within the Iraqi government 
equally thorny. 
Despite all of these difficulties and obstacles to success, the new plan to limit 
armed conflict in Baghdad in order to give the new Iraqi government the political space 
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to reconcile its differences is not necessarily impossible, although the odds are long at 
this late stage.  Since the coalition formally commenced the security plan on 14 February 
2007, as of 26 February Iraqi police have only discovered 164 bodies, versus 390 for the 
same period in January; Iraqi army Brig. Gen. Qassim Moussawi proclaimed two days 
into the operation that only 10 bodies were in the Baghdad morgue, down from 40-50 per 
day before the security plan’s implementation.159  One Sunni resident commented that the 
“intensive security measures have forced the gunmen to leave Baghdad and quit throwing 
bodies in the streets.”160  However, LTG Odierno cautioned against sounding too 
optimistic, saying that he was “not willing to draw any conclusions yet, because it's only 
[been] three weeks.”161  Despite the relative downturn in sectarian executions since the 
security plan began, the same Sunni resident forebodingly said that “I am afraid that this 
phenomenon will appear again if the security measures end.”162 
This comment strikes at three very salient subjects: first, political will, for even if 
the new security plan for Baghdad overcomes the many obstacles in its path and 
succeeds, the U.S. will significantly draw down its forces in Iraq at some point due to 
strong domestic political currents in the U.S.  The second is more practical in nature: the 
U.S. Army and Marine Corps are increasingly under strain, and cannot continue the 
current operational tempo indefinitely.  These first two variables to the current Iraq 
strategy are very significant, and will probably force a U.S. drawdown by the summer of 
2008 (at the latest).  The last subject this comment hints at is the enemy’s will to continue 
the fighting; most of the belligerents have simply left Baghdad to patiently wait the surge 
out.   
Even if U.S. forces manage to substantially slow down the sectarian violence in 
the near term, in the long-term such an effort will make little difference because Iraq’s 
politicians, the ones who must bring real stability to the country, see Iraq’s politics as 
zero-sum through a societal lens, which does not bode well for their reconciliation 
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anytime soon.  Indeed, the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the first such 
analysis to assess the “surge,” notes that although: 
[t]here have been measurable but uneven improvements in Iraq’s security 
situation … the level of overall violence, including attacks on and 
casualties among civilians, remains high; Iraq’s sectarian groups remain 
unreconciled; AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks; and 
to date, Iraqi political leaders remain unable to govern effectively.163 
The report goes on to predict that “broadly accepted political compromises required for 
sustained security, long-term political progress, and economic development are unlikely 
to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and 
security developments.”164 
Even if the U.S. succeeds in further limiting conflict, it is quite likely that fighting 
will resume once U.S. forces withdraw; whether the U.S. leaves in three weeks or three 
years, the result will probably be the same.  Iraq’s politicians will most likely not 
negotiate with each other until they have a reason to, which in this case will probably not 
be until one side or the other has a marked military advantage, and can force a 
negotiation from a position of power, which will require more fighting by both sides, and 
unfortunately more suffering by Iraq’s innocent civilians. 
C. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?  U.S. POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
All of these conclusions obviously beg the question of what U.S. policy should be 
in Iraq given that societal identities and loyalties are stronger than ever, militias along 
societal lines are gaining increasing strength and influence, and the central government is 
essentially weak and ineffective, particularly in its capacity to stop the violence raging in 
Iraq.  I for one honestly thought when I arrived in Iraq in February 2005 that I would be 
out of Baghdad and living in a desert encampment by the end of the year.  For whatever 
reason, U.S. forces remained in Iraq’s major cities after the successful election in 
December 2005; if one were looking for a quick exit strategy that was likely it. 
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Given all of the factors listed above, I believe it is in the United States’ best 
interest to withdraw from Iraq’s urban areas to large bases in the desert, isolated from the 
populace, yet still within striking range to conduct attacks on al-Qaeda targets or other 
significant threats to U.S. interests.  If thought necessary, the U.S. could leave behind 
black operations forces to collect intelligence on terrorist cells, which are really the only 
short-term threats to U.S. security in Iraq.  Most importantly, U.S. forces would conduct 
two essential missions from these bases.  First, they would contain any civil strife 
resulting from our withdraw to Iraq, and not let it spill over into neighboring countries, 
which could cause destabilization, as, for example, happened to Rwanda’s neighbors after 
the hostilities in that country.  A part of this strategy is that U.S. forces would have to set 
up refugee camps so that the flow of people fleeing Iraq’s violence would not spill over 
into neighboring countries.  Second, U.S. forces would attempt to isolate Iraq from the 
detrimental outside influence of its neighbors, such as Iran, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi 
Arabia by patrolling Iraq’s borders.  
This strategy is advantageous for many reasons.  First, it allows the United States 
to continue to have significant presence in Iraq, even though the U.S. will lose most of its 
oversight on day-to-day security operations within the population centers.  Second, this 
strategy will result in a tremendous decrease in U.S. casualties, which are obviously the 
main impetus for the United States’ domestic erosion of political will to remain in Iraq.  
Attacks on these bases would be unlikely because they would be positioned far away 
from the populations, in which the insurgents hide.  Additionally, any personnel or 
vehicles approaching the bases would be easily seen at great distances, making a surprise 
attack highly unlikely.  Because of the remote locations, collateral damage would not be a 
hindrance for U.S. forces in the event they had to respond to an attack; conducting 
counter-battery fire if mortared would be possible because the insurgents would have no 
civilians to hide behind in the open desert.  These bases would also have to have their 
own landing strips so that supplies could be flown in, so that the bases are not dependant 
on long, unguarded supply routes that originate in Kuwait and are susceptible to attack.  
Although some casualties would be inevitable because patrols would still be conducted 
along parts of the border, they would drastically less than the numbers the U.S. 
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experiences today.  In sum, these bases would result in decreased casualties, which 
results in an increased acceptance at home for continued U.S. presence in Iraq.   
Third, U.S. forces could continue to train the Iraqi Security Forces from these 
bases if the United States wishes to do so.  This study does not recommend that the U.S. 
actually embedding advisory forces with Iraqi units, because doing so carries extreme 
operational risks, as these small forces would be far from any reinforcements.  The 
casualty rate that these soldiers would likely suffer would not ease the American public’s 
distaste for the current conflict, possibly undermining the broader strategy outlined here.  
Furthermore, as this study discussed, to whom are the Iraqi Army soldiers and policemen 
really loyal?  Although many Iraqi soldiers and policemen are fighting to create a stable 
Iraq, many more are more loyal to their militia or community, as explained in Chapter III, 
and giving them further training and more weapons is not necessarily desirable.  
Additionally, most Iraqi security forces are competent enough at the lower tactical 
levels,165 and more tactical level training by U.S. troops will not produce additional 
results commensurate with the risks involved.  In order for the Iraqi Security Forces to 
become effective, they must decide where their loyalties lie; their effectiveness has little 
to do with American soldiers acting in an advisory role.   
Fourth, by leaving the cities and therefore the Iraqi’s everyday lives, a very source 
of resistance to the Iraqi government and a target of the insurgency, the U.S. military 
occupation, would be greatly diminished.166  Fifth, the U.S. Army and Marines could 
reconstitute their forces at these bases, and husband their resources to act as a bulwark to 
the greater threat to stability in the region: Iran.  A revitalized ground force in Iraq would 
allow the United States to negotiate with Iran from a position of strength, rather than the 
weakness which Iran now perceives.  It should be noted, however, that the strategy 
recommended here is not a long-term strategy, but is an interim one.  Following whatever 
happens in Iraq after U.S. forces are withdrawn from the cities, and they have completed  
 
                                                 
165 Such as the Iraqi Army soldiers that the author observed. 
166 This tactic would probably work quite well in the short term, for perhaps a number of years, but 
may not be tenable as a long-term strategy if Iraqis of all communities set aside their differences and 
demanded the removal of all U.S. forces from the country. 
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their primary mission of containing the violence to Iraq, U.S. forces should be 
repositioned outside the country, most likely in Kuwait, where they could still act as a 
bulwark against Iran.  
At the same time, the U.S. must pressure the central Iraqi government to pursue a 
plan for federalism, because at this point their options are quite limited.  The conclusion 
this study has reached is that a unified, strong central Iraqi government is a pipe-dream at 
this late stage due to communal differences.  Another unpalatable solution is for another 
strong-man or dictator to take control of Iraq; this person would likely be a Shi`a, the 
decision would probably result in massive bloodshed, and would be a cruel irony after all 
of the U.S. efforts in Iraq.  Detractors of this option claim that there are too many mixed 
neighborhoods in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, for this plan to work.  Unfortunately, this 
becomes less of a constraint every day; the U.N. reported that at the end of 2006, across 
Iraq 470,094 people had been forcibly displaced since the Samarra bombing in February, 
38,766 of them Baghdad residents.167  These statistics are only the officially known 
numbers, and additionally only include the forcibly displaced persons, not the people that 
moved voluntarily due to societal pressures.  A decentralized, federal Iraq offers the only 
real short-term political solution to its problems; in the long-term, after generational 
healing has occurred, a unified Iraq may be possible again.   
Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack recently echoed these sentiments in a 
comprehensive study they conducted on possible solutions to the Iraq situation.  Their 
underlying assumption is that the current U.S. policy is not working, and that U.S. efforts 
to forestall a civil war are likely to fail.  Byman and Pollack first declared what is obvious 
to most pragmatists who study the Iraq situation: that the U.S. cannot just  
walk away from the chaos.  Even setting aside the humanitarian nightmare 
that will ensue, a full-scale civil war would likely consume more than 
Iraq: historically, such massive conflicts have often had highly deleterious 
effects on neighboring countries and other outside states.  Spillover from 
                                                 
167 UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report: 1 November—31 December 2006,” 3.  
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an Iraq civil war could be disastrous.  America has too many strategic 
interests at stake in the Middle East to ignore the consequences.168 
Byman and Pollack briefly describe the effects an Iraqi civil war could have on its 
neighbors, stating that “Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran are all major oil producers 
experiencing political and economic troubles.  Jordan is equally fragile and in a critical 
location.  We [the U.S.] may not like the Syrian regime, but it too is in delicate 
circumstances and its collapse might not serve our interests either.”169  Turmoil in Iraq’s 
neighbors, three of which provide a substantial amount of the world’s oil, would 
obviously have a significant impact not only on the oil supply, but on the world economy 
as a result of an oil price shock. 
After laying out this conclusion that is clear to most observers, Byman and 
Pollack then transition to why the U.S. should pursue a policy of containment of an Iraqi 
civil war, which is similar to the recommendations I laid out above, although less detailed 
at the operational level.  
D. CONCLUSIONS ON DEMOCRATIZATION AS A U.S. GRAND 
STRATEGY 
Regarding the U.S. experiment with exporting democracy, at this point the direct 
efforts of the most powerful democracy in the world have failed to bring democracy to 
Iraq.  What this means for future U.S. foreign policy decisions regarding democratization 
is open to debate.  One would hope that democratization does not get a bad name from 
the U.S. experiences in Iraq, but rather that the United States would reevaluate the 
methods used and the mistakes made before embarking on another such effort.  In their 
reevaluation, U.S. policy makers would do well to carefully heed the advice of Phillipe 
Schmitter, who observed that: 
 [d]emocracies generate particularly close linkages between groups in civil 
society and agencies of the state.  However, this threatens the operational 
autonomy of all public institutions and subverts their putative defence of 
                                                 
168 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Things Fall Apart: Containing The Spillover From An 
Iraqi Civil War,” The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, January 2007, XIII. 
169 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Things Fall Apart: Containing The Spillover From An 
Iraqi Civil War,” The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, January 2007, 3. 
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the general or common interest … Democracies encourage the open 
expression of conflicts of interest within the ruling group.  This destroys 
members’ capacity for unified action and, hence, their action as competent 
governors.170 
Had U.S. policy makers studied this and truly understood the communal dynamics that 
make up Iraq, they may have more carefully thought through the methods used to bring 
democracy to Iraq, if they chose to do so at all.  Schmitter additionally states that a 
government’s “legitimation will depend upon perceptions of the effectiveness, efficiency 
and fairness of political institutions in relation to specific ‘authoritative allocations.’”171  
At the current time, it is apparent that the link between society and political institutions is 
quite strong in Iraq, that there are fissures within the ruling Shi`as as well as with the 
other groups in the Iraqi government, and therefore the current government has difficulty 
making the decisive decisions necessary to consolidate control over the country.  It is also 
evident that societal interests and militias control many of the Iraqi government’s 
institutions, which the people now perceive as ineffective, unfair, and inefficient, making 
the government illegitimate.  All of these factors lead to an Iraqi government that is 
ineffective at the current time, with few prospects for improvement. 
 
                                                 
170 Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes, Rhythms, 
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